University of Texas at El Paso

DigitalCommons@UTEP
Open Access Theses & Dissertations

2013-01-01

"Operation Stone Garden": A Case Study Of
Legitimation Of Violence And The Consequences
For Mexican Immigrants In Chaparral, New
Mexico
David Haller Mckenney
University of Texas at El Paso, dhmc@miners.utep.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd
Part of the Sociology Commons
Recommended Citation
Mckenney, David Haller, ""Operation Stone Garden": A Case Study Of Legitimation Of Violence And The Consequences For Mexican
Immigrants In Chaparral, New Mexico" (2013). Open Access Theses & Dissertations. 1879.
https://digitalcommons.utep.edu/open_etd/1879

This is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UTEP. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Theses & Dissertations
by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UTEP. For more information, please contact lweber@utep.edu.

“OPERATION STONE GARDEN”: A CASE STUDY OF LEGITIMATION OF VIOLENCE
AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN CHAPARRAL, NEW
MEXICO

DAVID HALLER MCKENNEY
Department of Sociology and Anthropology

APPROVED:

Howard Campbell, Ph.D., Chair

Josiah Heyman , Ph.D.

Guillermina Nunez-Mchiri, Ph.D.

Kathleen Staudt , Ph.D.

Benjamin C. Flores, Ph.D.
Dean of the Graduate School

Copyright ©

by
DAVID HALLER McKENNEY
2013

Dedication

To the persecuted and those who help them resist.

“OPERATION STONE GARDEN”: A CASE STUDY OF LEGITIMATION OF
VIOLENCE AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN
CHAPARRAL, NEW MEXICO
by

DAVID HALLER MCKENNEY, ANTHROPOLOGY, BA

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at El Paso
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO
August 2013

Acknowledgements
No doubt I would not have developed the fine level of knowledge, scholarship and academic
skills I feel confident I acquired from all my professors and mentors in the University of Texas at El
Paso Department of Sociology and Anthropology (and a couple others, especially over in Political
Science). They are unmatched as the finest University Social Science experts in the American
Southwest; unparalleled in their expertise in U.S.-Mexico border research and understanding.
I am especially thankful to Howard Campbell, Ph.D., Anthropology; Josiah Heyman, Ph.D.,
Anthropology; Kathleen Staudt, Ph.D., Political Science; David Carmichael, Ph.D., Anthropology
Guillermina Nunez-Mchiri, Ph.D., Anthropology; Sara Grineski, Ph.D., Sociology; Timothy Collins,
Ph.D., Sociology; Ernesto Castaneda, Ph.D., Sociology; Theodore Curry, Ph.D., Criminology; Christina
Morales, Ph.D., Sociology; Aurolyn Luykx, Ph.D., Anthropology; Aurelia L. Murga, Ph.D, Sociology;
Cheryl Howard; Ph.D., Sociology. Also, Professor Tobin Hansen, a lightning bolt out of Oregon State
– soon to be a Professor of Anthropology – who returned to El Paso this summer, as he annually has for
years – providing me with encouragement, insight and inspiration. And last but certainly not least, a
special thanks to Richard Dugan from the UTEP library, the best editor at “The Pass”.
Thank you all for giving your time to my education and help in evolving the quality of my
intellectual self and other important human characteristics to a level I had not imagined possible. I
promise it will not be for not.

v

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................ v
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................................vi
List of Illustrations .............................................................................................................................. vii
Frontispieces………………………………………………………………………..............................1
Chapter 1: Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 3
Chapter 2: Theoretical Frame and Literature Review ........................................................................... 8
Chapter 3: Methods…………………………………………………………………………………..21
Chapter 4: Ethnographic Case Study of Chaparral, Operation Stone Garden and the Mobility Regime……..……..32
Chapter 5: Summary & Conclusion

. .............................................................................................. 93

Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................... 109
Vita……………………………………………………………………………................................113

vi

List of Illustrations
Frontispiece One: First Atomic Bomb Test, White Sands, New Mexico…….…………………………...1
Frontispiece Two: “Sister Cities” – El Paso, Texas and Juárez, Chihuahua. ..…….……………………...2
Illustration 1.1: Satellite view of Juárez / El Paso borderland.………………………………………..…..6
Illustration 1.2: Satellite view of Chaparral, New Mexico. …………………………….……………..….7
Illustration 2.1: What do children learn when their country commits mass murder?. ….……………….17
Illustration 2.2: Twin Trade Towers on Sept. 11th, 2001………………………………….......................18
Illustration 2.3: George W. Bush, War on Terror, MADNESS……………………….…………………19
Illustration 2.4: Legitimation of Violence, the Mobility Regime & Immigrants……….……………….20
Illustration 3.1: David McKenney’s home in Chaparral, New Mexico..…………….………………….28
Illustration 3.2: Catholic Church in Chaparral, New Mexico..…………………………..………………29
Illustration 3.3: Sheriff Joe Arpaio abuse of power, aggression and violence……….………………….30
Illustration 3.4: Minutemen, Racists, Nativists, Neo-Nazis & Sheriff's Posses……….….......................31
Illustration 4.1: Immigrants’ Rights Equal Human Rights……………………………………………....84
Illustration 4.2: Regional gathering of the BNHR in El Paso, Texas c. 2012…………………………...85
Illustration 4.3.1: BNHR Regional committee meeting c. 2013……………………….………………..86
Illustration 4.4: BNHR community demonstration in El Paso, Texas c.2013…...……......…………….87
Illustration 4.5: El Paso Politicos at BNHR event in El Paso c.2013……………..…….…....................88
Illustration 4.6: Community members of the BNHR engaging in dialogue with the Border Patrol..……..………………89
Illustration 4.7: 7: BNHR Director with community member citizens, residents ……...……………….90
Illustration 4.8: Immigrant community members at BNHR rally c. 2013.……………...……………….91
Illustration 4.9: Border Fence Peace Demonstration between Sunland Park, NM & Anapara, Chihuahua………………..92
Illustration 5.1: Josiah Heyman, President, Border Network for Human Rights, 2013..………………108
Illustration 5.2: Border Fence Demonstration, Sunland Park/Anapara, 2011……………….…………108
vii

Illustration 5.3-a: Border Fence Demonstration, Sunland Park/Anapara, 2011.…………………………….109
Illustration 5.3-b: Mexican side of fence between Anapra and Sunland Park, 2011.…………..…….. 109

viii

Frontispiece

First Atomic Bomb Test: White Sands, New Mexico July 16, 1945…When a government uses,
“smart bombs”, predator drones, depleted uranium tank rounds, and atomic bombs, etc… to kill
hundreds of thousands of humans in civilian populations what is the model of behavior they set for
the people they govern? What effect does a government’s attack on populations and mass murder
of humans during war have on the value of human life in the minds of its citizens?

1

The “Sister Cities” of El Paso, Texas and Juárez, Chihuahua. This photo was shot from the vantage point of
a Juárez neighborhood just south of the international border. The tall buildings in the
background are downtown El Paso.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

While globalization is widely theorized in terms of apolitical trans-border flows, this paper
argues that the so-called “War on Terror,” the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the so-called
“War on Drugs” have legitimated the use of violence and aggression. This includes
criminalization, closure, containment and deportation directed at trans-national flows of
immigrants. Immigrants have become conflated with terrorists, drugs, crime and contamination as
a generalized “other,” to use Simmel’s (1908) terms; they are typed as suspicious and dangerous
strangers. From this perspective I suggest that the rise of contemporary security regimes or “the
mobility regime” that emerged well before the terror attacks of September 11th, 2001, has been
fertilized by those attacks and the wars that followed.
The mobility regime is premised upon a “paradigm of suspicion” that mixes the perceived
threats of crime, immigration, and terrorism and fosters the organization of global riskmanagement strategies in multi-scalar forces of persecution involving a set of actors from federal,
state, county and local levels of society. In the unincorporated town of Chaparral, New Mexico
these multi-scalar forces of persecution involved the mutual strengthening of local racism and
federal border strengthening. In the current period of legitimated violence and suspicion, I theorize
that the stranger is most vulnerable to violence and aggression from the different multi-scalar
forces of persecution who constitute a mobility regime or security regime.
As a location which highlights the elemental forms of the mobility regime, this paper
examines Chaparral, New Mexico, and its large Mexican immigrant

community who are

confronted by the sociological affinity between guarded borders on one side and gated
communities on the other. I posit that as violence became legitimated and fear of suspicious
strangers escalated to the level of national hysteria, the Mexican immigrant families who attempted
settlement in Chaparral became most vulnerable to the aggression of the mobility regime and its
global risk-management strategies. In the summer of 2007 these strategies culminated in an
unprecedented attack upon these immigrant families by elements of the mobility regime under the
guise of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) antiterrorism initiative called ‘Operation Stone
3

Garden.’ Stone Garden is a post 9-11-01 DHS program to fund and enlist local law enforcement
on the U.S.-Mexico border in the effort to catch anti-American terrorists, intercept Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD) from being smuggled into the U.S., drug and human smuggling
organizations, and violent criminals. But in the summer of 2007 the Otero County Sheriff’s
Department targeted dozens of settled immigrant families (Mexican Americans, undocumented
immigrants, and mixed-status households) in Chaparral, New Mexico. None of the immigrants
targeted by the Otero Sheriff’s Operation Stone Garden raids had any connection to the official
purpose of Stone Garden.
The Otero Sheriff’s Deputies used Stone Garden as an excuse to launch a brutal,
inhumane, community-wide immigration sweep in Chaparral. This research analyzes that
persecution in the context of the ‘Legitimation of Violence’ (LOV) model (Archer and Gardner
1984) and the community resistance that rose against it. Furthermore, this case exhibits the
systematic attempt to block, contain and destroy immigrant settlements and transnational flows of
humans who attempt mobility across borders as a strategy of survival and the human rights effort
to protect the persecuted immigrants; multi-scalar forces of persecution/the mobility regime vs.
multi-scalar forces of resistance/the human rights regime. I studied these issues first-hand during
2003-2005 while I lived in Chaparral, New Mexico, an unincorporated community located just
across the Texas state line 15 miles north of El Paso, Texas and its “sister city”, Juárez, Mexico.
In 2003, friends in El Paso warned me not to move to Chaparral. They said it was “a deadend town, out in the middle of the desert, populated by low-class White “trailer trash” and
“wetbacks’’ from Mexico; a lawless, gang-ridden town, the largest unincorporated town in the
United States.” In short, people in El Paso look down on those in Chaparral. The city of El Paso
even went so far as to place landfills and garbage dumps on the edge of Texas, bordering the state
line with New Mexico adjacent to Chaparral. To many in El Paso, Chaparral exists as “a scary
trailer-trash town next to the old city dumps, and it is very dark out there at night” (interview with
Maria X, an El Paso woman with friends in Chaparral).
Many in El Paso do not realize that Chaparral occupies 25 square miles and has over
4

20,000 residents. Many residents of Chaparral united to petition and shut-down El Paso’s
landfills/garbage dumps. New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson joined them and the dumps
finally closed in 2005 upon agreement of the El Paso City Council. The closing of the dumps was a
significant step forward for Chaparral in terms of environmental quality. But, in a sense, the dumps
had protected the immigrant settlement in Chaparral. As long as the dumps remained open and an
endless stream of garbage from El Paso was sent there, Chaparral was limited to attracting lower
status residents, such as the undocumented immigrants. The closing of the dumps and a growing
awareness and appreciation for a large volume of well water below Chaparral created an incentive
for real estate developers and others in Chaparral to attempt a shift from a desert ghetto to a
bedroom community of El Paso.
How to justify the removal of thousands of Mexican immigrants from the community was
answered (they thought) by the so called “War on Terror” and associated legitimation of violence.
Fear of anti-American terrorists and the conflation of that perceived threat with “suspicious”
strangers from Mexico was the opportunity that real estate developers, racists and nativists in
Chaparral chose not to pass up. The timing of the “War on Terror”, associated legitimation of
violence and 2005 closing of the El Paso dumps next to Chaparral created a perfect storm for the
immigrant settlement in Chaparral.

5

Illustration1.1: Satellite view of Juárez / El Paso borderland. Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, México is in the
lower center-left quarter of image. El Paso, Texas, USA is adjacent to Juárez at its north
and east. Chaparral, New Mexico is straight north of El Paso (top-center of image). The
Doña Ana County side of Chaparral has its boundary outlined - forming a quadrilateral
shape. The Otero County side of Chaparral is just outside the quadrilateral to the east.
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Illustration 1.2: Chaparral, New Mexico...The Doña Ana County side of Chaparral’s boundary is outlined
to form the large quadrilateral shape. The Otero County side of Chaparral is east of the
quadrilateral, across County Line Rd. which the right side of the quadrilateral traces. The
southern edge of the quadrilateral traces the state line between Texas and New Mexico. El
Paso and Juárez are 15-20 miles straight south. To the north and east is the Tularosa
Basin and millions of acres of military land; Fort Bliss, Biggs Army Airfield, McGregor
Range, Holloman Air Base and White Sands Missile range.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Frame and Literature Review
Legitimation of Violence
Dane Archer and Rosemary Gartner (1984), the criminologists who developed the
Comparative Crime Data File (CCDF) in 1984, examined a number of research questions. In
analyzing crime statistics, they developed a theory that is a core concept of this article. Their
theory proposes that a nation which has recently been at war will experience an increase in the
level of postwar homicide and violence within its own borders. The Legitimation of Violence
Model (LOV) posits that the presence of authorized or sanctioned killing during war has a marked
residual effect on the level of homicide in peacetime society. “The idea that war might increase the
level of postwar homicide in combatant societies has occurred to many researchers” (Archer &
Gartner, 1984, p. 95). However, the Legitimation of Violence Model, which predicts postwar
increases as a result of the official sanction of killing in wartime, is the only model Archer &
Gartner (1984) concluded “explained the postwar increases in domestic violence and homicide” (p.
96).
The legitimation model’s central concept is “that civilian members of a warring society also
are influenced by the ‘model’ of officially approved wartime killing and destruction. During a war,
a society reverses its customary prohibitions against killing and instead honors acts of violence
which would be regarded as murderous in peacetime” (p. 76). Several researchers have suggested
that this social approval or legitimation of violence produces a lasting reduction of inhibitions
against taking human life. Furthermore, since civilians and soldiers alike may be influenced by the
legitimation process, this model predicts that homicide increases will occur both among veterans
and nonveterans. Also, we can expect not only an increase in homicides, but also increases in
aggression and violence in general as civilians, and those in local, state, and federal law
enforcement and government feel more justified in using aggression and violence against others to
solve perceived problems and remove perceived threats.

Related to the concepts of social

learning theory (Bandura, 1977), I believe the legitimation of violence model can explain more
than an increase in homicides and physical violence. It can further explain a general cheapening of
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the value of human life in the minds and practices of individuals and communities in a society, in
this case, the United States, and particularly vis-à-vis the Chaparral, New Mexico community. In
short, the legitimation of violence model can also be understood as a way to help explain how
individuals in society justify the localized dehumanization of others and the use of aggression and
violence as means of dealing with others, especially strangers, that is, those construed by
community members to be suspicious and potential threats to the community. Community
members, through both governmental and unofficial action, flex political and economic muscle to
maintain control and promote the meanings, values, beliefs, and community action they deem
necessary to protect their interests, which they often conflate and confuse with the stability, safety
and security of the community in general. In the case of Mexican immigrants, violence and
aggression by the government takes the form of obstructing mobility, detainment, division of
families and deportation.
As potential elements of the multi-scalar forces of persecution in the mobility/security
regime, I emphasize that local community members have the power to affect and utilize the forces
of the local, state and federal government and law enforcement in order to perform acts of
aggression and violence against strangers they perceive as threats. Archer & Gartner (1984)
addressed the concept of violence and aggression as part of government action within the
boundaries of a warring nation when violence has been legitimated through the war. They also
expressed their wish to gather data that focuses on the use of violence by “official” actors of the
state, including law enforcement. While no such data was available to Archer and Gartner, the
unprecedented use of aggression by local and federal law enforcement in 2007 against Mexican
immigrants in Chaparral can be understood to be associated with the legitimation of violence due
to the U.S. engagement in foreign wars, including the wars on terrorism and drugs and the
conflation of these with the issue of “illegal” immigration.
The term “violence” typically is associated with dangerous individuals. We tend to think of
violent acts and violent actors in distinct, individualized form. This individualistic bias overshadows other real violence committed by authorities in the pursuit of social control, or by
9

governments engaged in war. Homicide and other serious violence, is produced routinely by the
government during the course of criminal punishment and executions, crowd and riot control,
political subversion and assassination and, of course war itself. Individual acts of violence are
treated as illegal violence, official acts of violence are believed justified by state authority, and
protected from review, criticism and criminal sanction. Official violence is privileged but cannot
be explained away by the idea that the ends justify the means, since the means can be most
grotesque. Perhaps the best example – war, now consisting of mass murder by so called “smart
bombs,” predator drones with “Hell-Fire Missiles”, depleted uranium tank rounds, and still the
looming threat of the nuclear weapons option, consists of mass murder on a scale that greatly
overshadows the individual acts of even the most gruesome mass murderers.
In the U.S., police aggression against Mexican immigrants is often seen as justified, as
evidenced by the community support in Arizona for Maricopa County sheriff, Joe Arpaio, and his
anti-immigrant policies, including discriminatory profiling of Hispanics, aggressive and violent
“immigration sweeps” of Hispanic immigrant neighborhoods, separation of immigrant families,
arrest and confinement in deportation centers and finally deportation to Mexico. It has been the
policy and strategy of some government officials and law enforcement authorities to instill fear in
immigrants from Mexico who attempt to migrate and settle within the United States. Sheriff
Arpaio is perhaps the best known embodiment of localized mobility regime elements in the multiscalar forces of persecution for not only physically pursuing, attacking and apprehending Mexican
immigrants but also for engaging in a form of psychological warfare in a blatant campaign of fear
directed at Mexican immigrants. He has stated that “the fear factor” is particularly important,
because fearful immigrants wouldn’t choose to settle in Maricopa County (Sterling, 2010 p.88).
Sheriff Arpaio applies that fear factor caused by immigration sweeps in predominantly Hispanic
neighborhoods, often performed by hundreds of paid deputies, supplemented by community
volunteer “deputies” (i.e., “The Sheriff’s Posse,” a group of mostly white male retirees from the
Midwest living in retirement communities such as Sun City, Arizona). Arpaio justifies the use of
fear on Mexican immigrant communities because he says it “caused disproportionate psychological
10

distress” (Sterling, 2010 p.88) on Hispanics (particularly Mexican immigrants and their families).
Mexican immigrants live in fear throughout the borderlands where Border Patrol (BP) and,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents are thick on the ground, and other elements
of the mobility regime: nativists and racist groups such as the Minutemen, Neo-Nazis, other local
versions of Arpaio’s Sheriff’s Posse, right-wing cliques and communities have risen in reaction to
Globalization and the associated increased migrant worker flows.
Fueled by nativist hysteria that followed the terror attacks of September 11th, 2001 and by
the resulting “War Against Terror,” anti-immigrant prejudices manifest themselves in immigration
sweeps in immigrant communities near the southern border – such as the 2007, Otero County, New
Mexico Sheriff’s immigration sweeps in Chaparral under the auspices of the multi-jurisdictional
antiterrorism Operation Stone Garden funded by the Department of Homeland Security. If violent
acts can compel imitation, it is more than likely that official violence such as war also provides a
model for the postwar acts of individuals. Wars carry the full authority of the state. Wars also
reward soldiers for killing when they are labeled as “heroes” and decorated or lionized, often in
direct proportion to the number of homicides they have committed. Or, as in the case of Operation
Stone Garden, the number of “suspicious strangers” apprehended and removed.
Simmel, the Stranger, and Othering that Legitimates Violence
Simmel (1908) emphasizes that the stranger in a sociological sense is not necessarily
someone completely unknown to us, say to the degree inhabitants of a village in Afghanistan are
unknown to residents of a small town in America. In Simmel’s sense, the villagers in Afghanistan
are beyond being far or near, as they do not truly exist in the sense of being a stranger at all. To be
a stranger one has to be known, implying nearness, but remote still in the sense of a lack of close
historical and ongoing connection to the established group. To be a stranger in Simmel’s (1908)
sociological sense, individuals need to be “an element of the group itself, not unlike the poor and
the sundry “inner enemies” – an element whose membership within the group involves both being
outside it and confronting it” (Simmel, 1908, p. 1).
Grasping the dimensions of what Simmel means by “inner enemies” is important to the
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synthesis of Simmel’s concept of the stranger as is Archer and Gartner’s legitimation of violence
model for application to my research in Chaparral. In short, to be an “inner enemy,” of a group or
community, one must be close enough to be “in” the group or community, but still distant enough
to be perceived as a potential threat or enemy. The distance from the group allows for the group to
conflate the stranger with the generalized other associated with those perceived as a threat to
America, such as anti-American terrorists, against whom aggression and violence are most
legitimated.
In the hysteria created by terrorist attacks against the U.S., war, and the War on Terror, a
seemingly all-inclusive type of generalized other that encompasses all “others” who are “outside”
the group, was constructed in the belief system of U.S. citizens and then applied liberally to anyone
perceived as being anti-American, or sufficiently lacking in “American” beliefs and values. The
theory of legitimation of violence not only explains the rise in domestic homicides, but also, the
idea that human beings in general are devalued and treated as less than they were before. “The
Stranger,” in this case, the Mexican immigrant in Chaparral is dehumanized under the citizenshipnationalistic framework and furthermore when violence is legitimated. The stranger becomes more
vulnerable to violence and aggression by insiders and their government. Rational and
compassionate approaches to dealing with strangers are abandoned in favor of irrational and
aggressive “solutions” to handling the generalized and perceived threat of strangers from outside.
In Chaparral, multi-scalar forces of persecution interact to form a security or mobility
regime. Dominant community insiders, including longtime residents; elite business operators; real
estate investors and developers; political actors; and racists marshal others to action in their
immediate and inter-connected social domains. Political operatives, government officials and
police forces are called to action by community elites. Community elites have power either by an
official position which they occupy or by means of their cultural, social, and economic capital.
Therefore, it can be understood that local community members who have official status or other
capital can, at times dictate to higher level officials at the county, state or federal level what they
perceive the local “problem” to be, and what they believe needs to be done. This is in part what
12

happened in Chaparral.
Additionally, as violence is legitimated by the national government, individuals at local
community levels become more open to the use of aggression and violence against perceived
threats to the community. Said’s (1978) original use of “the other” was in terms of colonized
peoples but the term can be applied to similar peoples and situations. The other is construed as a
degenerate type on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, both in order to justify conquest and to
establish systems of administration and instruction. “The colonized population is then deemed to
be both the cause and effect of the system, imprisoned in the circle of interpretation” (p. 792).
Furthermore, others who come from outside the United States, including Mexican immigrants,
become conflated with terrorist threats as well as other threats, including violent drug and human
smuggling organizations and violent criminal gangs. Any type of generalized threatening other is
socially constructed. In Heyman’s (2010) terms these others become “securitized” by Homeland
Security policy, which degrades their status and mobility. This is an outcome sought by the multiscalar forces of persecution of the mobility regime for which Homeland Security functions as a
clearing house.
The 9/11 terror attacks in the U.S. and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq set up a selfperpetuating cycle that enhances the legitimation of violence, as do the U.S. and Mexican War on
Drugs and associated violence, both in opposition to, and committed by, criminal drug
organizations and Mexican drug cartels. And so does the citizenship-nationalistic framework
associated with blockading the border; forcing immigrants into harsh deserts where they may die.
As Mexican immigration is conflated with perceived threats, opinions on immigration and official
policy become conflated with security issues manifested by government bureaucracies such as the
Department of Homeland Security. In short, the War on Drugs becomes conflated with the War on
Terror, as well as with the issue of Mexican immigrants who are now construed as potential threats
and dangerous others from the outside. A “Fortress America” mentality sets in, by which all those
outside the fortress are construed and typified as threatening enemies. In this way fear of a
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generalized dangerous other also becomes conflated with perceived threats to the general economic
and cultural well-being of the community and country.

Strangers and Mobility Regimes, and the Legitimation of Violence
Shamir (2005) explains “the strangers” predicament in contemporary times in which
a “paradigm of suspicion” has developed along with the rise of the “mobility regime”:

“Under a newly articulated paradigm of suspicion, new forms of social participation and
association are conditioned by the emergence of a mobility regime that aims at curbing the
movement of strangers precisely at a historical moment when it is becoming harder to establish
who is a stranger. The ‘stranger’, in this sense, has become the one who is constituted as a suspect
[‘securitized’ in Heyman’s (2010) terms], facing an expansive set of physical, psychological, and
sociological fences, a subject of a mobility regime that operates not only through visible presence
on borders and the policing of bounded spaces but also through multilayered gestures of closure
that operate at the most minute aspects of social interaction. The stranger is now fully recognized,
simultaneously as a universal rights-bearer and a universal threat” (p. 215).

Shamir (2005) understands that globalization and its related flows of people acting in
transnational form is a cause of the mobility regime. The mobility regime is also affected by the
legitimation of violence. The “War on Terror” and legitimation of violence do fertilize and
encourage the mobility regime to act in more aggressive and violent fashion against perceived
threatening forms and flows, including Mexican immigrants. Shamir (2005) explains that “a
significant body of literature indicates that the era of globalization is simultaneously an era of
growing restrictions on movement… while globalization is a lived reality of hypermobility for a
small social stratum of “cosmocrats,” mobility is still a scarce resource and the overwhelming
majority of the world’s population is more or less permanently immobilized” (p. 197-198).
While other literature indicates many theorists are all more or less in agreement that
14

globalization is largely about “free movement across national boundaries” and cross-border
interdependencies, Shamir (2005) and others (Campbell & Heyman, 2009) propose a counterconception of the processes of globalization. Shamir (2005) conceives of the processes of
globalization as “also producing their own principles of closure” (p.199). He argues that we are
witnessing the emergence of a new cultural/normative global principle that operates as a
counterbalance to the normative principle of global human rights. Related to tensions such as those
between national sovereignty and human rights, we witness the emergence of a global mobility
regime, oriented to closure and to the blocking of access, premised not only on “old” national or
local grounds but on a principle of perceived universal dangerous personhoods, a condition Shamir
refers to as “a paradigm of suspicion” (p. 199). Under this paradigm the local, national, and
regional boundaries are rebuilt and consolidated under the increased normative pressure of, and
counter to, the universal human rights regime. The mobility regime is constructed to maintain high
levels of inequality in a relatively and normatively homogenized world. The Obama administration
has detained and deported more immigrants than any previous administration (Slevin, 2010, and
also Lee 2010). This is an indication of the rise of the mobility regime and its integrated risk
management system in operation.

Forms of the Mobility Regime
Shamir (2005) also perceives the mobility regime as operating within the perimeters of
privileged localities, countries, and economic and political blocs. Shamir distinguishes between
“those elementary forms that work through the prevention of exit (e.g., prisons) and those
elementary forms that work through the prevention of entry (e.g., gated communities)” (p. 206).
Although, these two forms of social isolation are associated with and manage different social
classes or strata while functioning on diametrically opposite logics, Shamir says “they may be
sociologically located along a continuum of practices designed to consolidate a mobility regime in
general and to strategically distance suspect social elements in particular” (ibid).
Shamir (2005) finds it more compelling to treat such distinct phenomena both as products
15

of distinct strategies of group power rather than collapse prisons and gated communities into a
single category. In the case of prisons, he says group power is manifested in “the power of
dominant groups to stigmatize, isolate, and immobilize suspect groups by controlling their exit
rights” (ibid). While in the case of gated communities, he states that it is “the power of dominant
groups to isolate themselves from suspect groups by controlling their rights of entry into certain
designated social spaces” (ibid). In short, Shamir observes that “the integrated risk-management
system of the mobility regime is predicated upon two pillars: segregating suspect social elements in
prisons, urban ghettos, and quarantines on the one hand; and sheltering privileged groups in gated
communities, secured work places, and guarded shopping malls on the other” (ibid).

16

Illustration 2.1: What do children learn when their country commits mass murder on a scale that greatly
overshadows the individual acts of even the most gruesome mass murderers?
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Illustration 2.2: WAR cheapens all human life in the collective consciousness of a nation and legitimates
the use of violence and aggression as a means to solve conflicts and problems. The
Legitimation of Violence Model (LOV) posits that a nation which has recently been at
war will experience an increase in the level of postwar homicide and violence within its
own borders. LOV predicts that the presence of authorized or sanctioned killing during
war has a marked residual effect on the level of homicide in peacetime society; postwar
increases in violence in the homeland are a result of the official sanction of killing in
wartime. The nation’s citizens, including law enforcement, are more likely to use
violence and aggression against others when the government sets the model of violence in
war.
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Illustration 2.3: Homicide and other serious violence, is produced routinely by the government
during the course of criminal punishment and executions, crowd and riot control, political
subversion and assassination and, of course war itself. Individual acts of violence are
treated as illegal violence, official acts of violence are believed justified by state
authority, and protected from review, criticism and criminal sanction. Official violence is
privileged but cannot be explained away by the idea that the ends justify the means, since
the means can be most grotesque.
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Illustration 2.4: While globalization is widely theorized in terms of apolitical trans-border flows, the socalled “War on Terror,” the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the so-called “War on
Drugs” have legitimated the use of violence and aggression; fertilizing the mobility
regime and its multi-scalar forces of persecution; influencing it to act abusive and violent.
This includes criminalization, closure, containment and deportation directed at transnational flows of immigrants.
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Chapter 3: Methods

Originally from the Chicago area, but having lived in El Paso from 1980-83 as a teenager
attending UTEP, I did not return to El Paso until 1999 at the age of thirty-seven. Not until 2003,
the time of my move to Chaparral, after becoming inspired by the Presidential candidacy of
Howard Dean did I emerge from a period of reclusion with my books and begin to connect with a
community. I was ignorant of Chaparral and its people as well of the BNHR (I wish I had known
of them back then). I began to build my own network with the people in the community around me,
including the families, many of which were immigrants from Mexico – citizens, undocumented
and mixed-status households; also the gang kids; other Democratic Party members; and friends in
El Paso I knew from my years at UTEP in the early 1980s. Soon I connected with several
Democratic Party members in Las Cruces, a bastion of them.
Something about Chaparral was very intriguing to me. It seemed a sort of miserable deadend sort of place. It seemed to me it could be much more than it was. I was intrigued and inspired
to engage that community for some reason. Perhaps it had something to do more with the macro
scene in the world at the time; President George W. Bush was a madman in my opinion; I believed,
and still strongly do that, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were very misguided and harmful to
society; and so was the so-called “War on Terror.” I did not know it by name at the time but knew
what the legitimation of violence (LOV) was. It is a theory from the basics of the “social learning
theory” (Bandura 1977). It is a fundamental consequence when the government engages in war
providing the model of behavior and attitude associated with aggression and violence toward
fellow human beings. I resided in Chaparral from 2003-2005 in a trailer home located on land
that I purchased from a fellow UTEP student. In 2007 I heard about the Otero County Sheriff’s
anti-immigrant activities and their on-going raids in Chaparral and read about them in the El Paso
Times newspaper when they occurred. I closely followed the case when the immigrants fought
back in the federal courts with the help of attorneys from the Paso del Norte Civil Rights Project
and other organizations such as the Border Network for Human Rights (BNHR). I was pleased to
read that the Otero County Sheriff decided to settle, agreeing to cease and desist and stop violating
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the civil rights of immigrants and Hispanics with unlawful searches, interrogations, invasions of
privacy and detentions, and never again perform immigration raids or sweeps on the settled
immigrant community of Chaparral.
I was particularly interested when Professor Josiah Heyman of UTEP approached me with
the opportunity to review the legal documents and other information from the Paso del Norte Civil
Rights Project case file regarding the federal lawsuit filed on behalf of the immigrants and other
Hispanic victims of the Sheriff’s Department attack on the community. Dr. Heyman was aware that
I had lived in Chaparral from 2003-2005 and that I had been involved in community related
activities in Chaparral, from the political, as a Howard Dean and Doña Ana County Democratic
Party organizer and as a member of the Doña Ana County Democratic Party Central Committee, to
regular attendance at the “community development meetings” of the Chaparral Community
Development Association (CCDA), as well as my involvement in a varied assortment of
community organizations and groups which directly confronted, and was confronted by, the
dominant social forces and persecution forces of Chaparral.
Professor Heyman was interested in what I could add to understanding the Chaparral –
Operation Stone Garden case. We were both interested in attempting to answer the question: Why
had the immigrants been targeted by the Otero County Sherriff’s deputies? What exactly was
“Operation Stone Garden”? What happened in Chaparral during the implementation of Operation
Stone Garden?

And, importantly, how had the immigrants and the other Hispanic victims

responded and fought back? These questions guided my research and the development of my
theory, particularly the question: Why had the immigrants been targeted? What forces could
motivate and allow such aggression and violence against harmless families of Mexican
immigrants?
In reviewing the Paso del Norte Civil Rights Project case file and the archive of newspaper
articles about Operation Stone Garden in Chaparral I formed opinions and hypotheses anchored in
my personal experiences and observations gained from my life in Chaparral from 2003-2005. I also
revisited Chaparral since 2005 to talk with my old neighbors and with new acquaintances. I
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completed follow-up interviews and made new observations. I also often spoke with people from
Chaparral now living in El Paso and interviewed El Paso residents in regard to Chaparral. I made
note of some major changes in Chaparral, especially the construction of new schools and the major
turn-over in the sheriff’s department personnel in Chaparral. All of the testimony gathered served
only to confirm my suspicions about what went on before, during and after Operation Stone
Garden in Chaparral in the summer of 2007.
The same basic power dynamics continue to exist today; people may move and transfer out
and tactics may change but the ingrained culture lives on and the immigrants are still hunted and
deported. Operation Stone Garden is still operational to this very day throughout the American
Southwest but the deputies are a little more careful, at least in Chaparral, not to blatantly violate
civil rights of immigrants and Hispanics, at least not as blatantly as they did in 2007.
My 2003-2005 experience in Chaparral provided me with a backdrop of deep participant
observation in which I was able to collect several oral histories of a variety of Chaparral residents;
Republicans, Democrats, police officials (state, county, and federal), drug dealers, smugglers,
retirees, laborers,

business owners,

gang members, immigrants (both documented and

undocumented), Catholics, Evangelical Christians - and other Protestants, ranchers, Hispanic
Americans, Non-Hispanic White Euro-Americans, African-Americans, ex-military, military,
German and Korean “War-Brides”, nativists,

humanists, real estate developers, community

development association members, teachers, priests, nuns, neighbors, government officials and
politicians. While I did not move to Chaparral specifically to perform ethnographic research it
naturally became such.
I started keeping a journal in 2003 that included my observations from attendance at
Community Development Association (CCDA) meetings, political functions, as well as daily life
with neighbors and others in Chaparral. I started categorizing different individuals and groups;
Republican, Democrat, Catholic, Evangelical, West Side Loco (WSL) or De Otero Side (DOS) –
[the two most dominant gangs of boys at the time], immigrant, undocumented immigrant, business
operator, drug smuggler, drug dealer, laborer, pro-George W. Bush, anti- George W. Bush, pro23

War, anti-War, nice person, mean person, racist, nativist, humanist, friend and enemy.
My position as an outside “stranger”; a liberal White-Euro-American who became a
Howard Dean Democratic organizer in Chaparral and elsewhere in Doña Ana County, then Doña
Ana County Democratic Party Central Committee member and organizer for Chaparral with a
liberal agenda was an effective vehicle for discovering who was who in Chaparral. In a community
dominated by a minority-majority-right-wing “Tea Party” (before the label had emerged)
Republican clique my entrance and activities in Chaparral can be understood as a type of symbolic
violence. Politics is inherently symbolically violent and while symbolic violence is something
social scientists usually try to avoid during ethnographic research, it is a strategy that can bring
community members out of the woodwork and make them and the meanings they assign to the
world around them known. This is, in fact, how it turned out for me in Chaparral.
I was symbolically violent and it did introduce me to many residents of Chaparral,
including the gatekeepers, power players and persecutors in the community. At the CCDA
meetings I met the pseudo-governmental powers and official persecutors (sheriffs) of Chaparral. In
my neighborhood I met the wide variety of people mentioned above. I learned how they perceived
the world they lived in; politics, economics, war, terrorism, religion, sports, drugs, their Chaparral
community and others who lived in it, including those persecuted; Mexican immigrants; the
vulnerable, neglected, young kids in gangs; drug users and addicts. I took a wide qualitative
approach, anthropologically holistic, necessitated by my position as a political party organizer who
needed to understand who and what was going on in Chaparral in order to politically organize. But,
my research was also motivated by a selfish desire “to know.”
I wanted to know who the residents of Chaparral were. And, as someone also with a focus
in criminology, I became fascinated with who sold drugs? How were drugs from Mexico smuggled
into El Paso and Chaparral? What were the different street gangs and who were their members?
Also, who had been murdered, why and by whom? I do believe my research in Chaparral and
theoretical framework grounded in the legitimation of violence model does apply to the U.S. socalled “War on Drugs”, Mexican Drug Cartel Wars, and Presidente de México, Felipe Calderón’s
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complicity with the U.S. government’s “War on Drugs” in his “War on Mexican Drug Cartels”
backed and funded in large part by the U.S. government, most substantially in association with
“Plan Mérida”/”The Mérida Initiative”/” Plan Mexico” – an unprecedented security cooperation
agreement between the United States and the government of Mexico and the countries of Central
America.
The official U.S. and Mexican agreement under Mérida states that the aim is “combating
drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and money laundering” (Campbell 2009). Based on
official U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) records between 2008 and 2012, Congress
appropriated more than $1.9 billion for Mérida Initiative programs in Mexico. The initiative also
includes training, equipment and intelligence. Additionally, according to the U.S. Government
Research Service Report to Congress - June 12, 2013 - “U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The
Mérida Initiative and Beyond,” the Mexican government spent $46.6 billion of its own resources
on security and public safety” related to Mérida Initiative programs.
From 2008 through 2012 Mexican drug cartels escalated their violence against each other
to horrific levels -while the government of Presidente de México, Felipe Calderón, also went to
war against and, as many in Mexico believe, for, certain cartels - but there was very disturbing
violence already ongoing in Juárez , that I couldn’t help concerning myself with as many others in
the El Paso/ Juárez community were. Several hundred men and women had been missing and
turning up murdered. While the actual number of murdered men, by far, out-paced the number of
women – the number of murdered women; “three hundred and four women murdered in 2010”
(Campbell 2011, p.19) was alarming and gained the greater focus of the media and public. I
thought about the murders in Juárez and couldn’t help asking people from Mexico, or who
frequented there, who lived in Chaparral what they knew and thought about it.
But, while a Democratic Party organizer, in 2003 and 2004, I mainly wanted to know who
the Republicans were and who were the Democrats? What did people think of Howard Dean,
George W. Bush or John Kerry? Who supported the war in Iraq and who did not? Gradually, my
focus shifted by 2004 and 2005 to questions like: How did Mexican immigrants navigate the
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international boundary and the El Paso southwest? Why did people choose to live in Chaparral?
Where did they come from? What did they do?
I did not discriminate in my search for the truth; I attempted to be engaging and cordial
with the entire gambit of Chaparral residents. I met with Democrats and Republicans, gangsters
and cops, nativists and immigrants, workers and business owners, friends and enemies. After two
years living in Chaparral I had a near insider’s understanding of Chaparral’s demographics and
varying groups, their attitudes and opinions, how the society was structured, who had the social,
political and economic power to affect the community and who did not. It would have taken
several more years, if ever, to really become a true insider. I was partly on the inside and partly on
the outside of the Chaparral community. I was a stranger similar to the immigrants but not of them.
Still, I developed a wide and solid perspective of the different groups and attitudes that made up
the Chaparral community. And, as a stranger from the outside I was able to maintain a relatively
neutral judgment.
My experiences in Chaparral from 2003-2005 also made me intimately familiar with the
geography and the number of intersecting borders and jurisdictions which are often confusing to
both outsiders and insiders alike. Chaparral is an unincorporated town divided between two New
Mexico counties (Otero and Doña Ana) at the Texas-New Mexico state line, approximately fifteen
to twenty miles north of the El Paso, Texas-Juárez, Mexico international boundary. To its east and
north, Chaparral is surrounded by millions of acres of Bureau of Land Management and military
property; Fort Bliss, McGregor Range, White Sands Missile Range, all lie within a hot, dry desert
“anvil of the sun” called the Tularosa Basin, in which Chaparral holds the southern rim. While
some prefer to think of Chaparral as a “bedroom community “of El Paso, to many others it is
instead a southwest border colonia.

Based on conversations with locals, U.S. Census data,

newspaper articles and personal observations I estimate that in 1980 there were only about 800
residents living in Chaparral, mostly White Euro-Americans. Today there are over 20,000 residents
and most are of Hispanic heritage, many are first-generation immigrants from Mexico.
I reviewed social science scholarship in regard to border community issues and
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immigration, circular migration, transnationalism, globalization, nativism, human rights of
immigrants, community policing, the so-called “War on Terror”, the so-called “War on Drugs”,
state aggression and violence. Combining my participant observation/ethnographic background
with the literature review and review of the federal lawsuit case file on the immigration raids in
Chaparral has enabled me to develop my own theory as to why the Hispanic / immigrant
community in Chaparral was targeted by the Otero County Sheriff’s deputies in the summer of
2007.
By explaining the worldviews, actions and motivations of different individuals and groups
in Chaparral we are better able to understand how the legitimation of violence (by the U.S. wars)
led to immigration raids in Chaparral. All subjects of and informants to my research are protected
by pseudonyms as well as the passing of years and events that allow for a retrospective
examination of the community and events that evolved over several years in Chaparral, in
particular the Operation Stone Garden events in the Summer of 2007.
Something about Chaparral was very intriguing to me. It seemed a sort of miserable deadend sort of place. It seemed to me it could be much more than it was. I was intrigued and inspired
to engage that community for some reason. Perhaps it had something to do more with the macro
level of society at the time; President George W. Bush was a madman in my opinion; I believed,
and still strongly do that, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were very misguided and harmful to
society; and so was the so-called “War on Terror.” I did not know it by name at the time but knew
what the legitimation of violence (LOV) was. It is a theory from the basics of the “social learning
theory” (Bandura 1977). It is a fundamental consequence when the government engages in war
providing the model of behavior and attitude associated with aggression and violence toward
fellow human beings.
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Illustration 3.1: David McKenney’s home 2003-2005 on the Doña Ana County side of
Chaparral, New Mexico. Photo was taken in 2013. Things are much the same as when
McKenney lived there.
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Illustration 3.2: Located on the Doña Ana County side in Chaparral, the Catholic Church including several
Nuns, as well as many other individuals in Chaparral and throughout the El Paso
southwest are forces in the Border Network for Human Rights (BNHR)
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Illustration 3.3: The rise of contemporary security regimes or “the mobility regime” emerged well before
the terror attacks on the U.S. in 2001 and the U.S. wars that followed but the regime has
been fertilized (financially and emotionally) by those acts of violence - resulting in more
wide spread abuses of power, aggression and violence by multi-scalar forces of
persecution (federal, state and local) against immigrants from Mexico.
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Illustration 3.4: In the summer of 2007, under the guise of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
antiterrorism initiative called ‘Operation Stone Garden’ - there was an unprecedented
community wide attack upon immigrant family settlements in Chaparral, New Mexico by
elements of the mobility regime including Otero County Sheriff’s Deputies.
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Chapter 4: Ethnographic Case Study of Chaparral, Operation Stone Garden and the Mobility Regime
Historical Background
El Paso-Juárez has deep socio-economic ties going back to the end of the U.S. – Mexican
War of 1846-1848. Perhaps that conflict is more accurately called the “U.S. War Against Mexico”
or the “U.S. Invasion of Mexico” considering it was prompted by the 1845 U.S. annexation of
Texas - still a territory of Mexico even though Texas staged a revolution against Mexico in 1836.
Heyman (2010a) explains that after the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 - “the
modern U.S.-Mexico boundary was established in 1848-1853 by a U.S. war of aggression” (p.
2).The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo designated the “south side of the Rio Grande as Paso del
Norte/El Paso, Mexico (eventually the name changed to Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico) and the north
side of the river as Franklin, Texas, United States (eventually that name changed to El Paso, Texas,
United States)” (Sonnichsen 1968).
According to the treaty - Mexican populations, as well as many autonomous Native
American peoples - stranded north of the border in California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas
were to keep their private properties and continue living as they had before the war, but that is not
what really happened. Owen P. White (1942) arrived in El Paso, Texas with his father and mother
in 1878. White’s father had just received a position as a U.S. deputy collector of customs in El
Paso. In White’s epic autobiography he says “in El Paso, with a population of less than forty
Americans, who held undisputed six-shooter control over four or five hundred Mexicans, was a
tough town which the problem of housing a family would have been a hard one for most men to
solve” (p. 5). It was not a problem for White’s father – “He solved it quite easily by calling at a
Mexican’s shack and suggesting to him that he forthwith vacate. He forthwith did so, and after my
father had paid him the eight or nine dollars – my mother moved in, and thus found herself in an
establishment that was all her own” (p. 5). I have no doubt, that White’s family and other
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Americans in 1878 El Paso were under the residual effects of the legitimation of violence that the
war against Mexico and U.S. Civil War that followed it had created.
Legitimation of Violence and Mobility Regimes in Chaparral, New Mexico
Heyman (2010a) says “Starting with the era of intensive capitalist development in the late
19th century, northward migration from Mexico to the U.S. has been nearly constant, due to the
unceasing labor demand from the colossus of the north. What has changed are U.S. policies toward
these migrants, and their treatment in the law” (p. 2). Over the last more-than-160 years there has
been great, regular circular migration between Mexico and the United States at what many locals
call the “sister cities,” Juárez and El Paso. It is apparent that as globalization has accelerated in
contemporary times associated increases in flows of migrants to the U.S. in search of work alarmed
nativists in the U.S. who solidified in support of the mobility regime.
Additionally, I argue that Al Qaida terror attacks on the U.S. in 2001 accelerated the rise
and growth of the mobility / security regimes (I will define the mobility /security regimes in
detail). As a result, circular migration between Mexico and the United States in the El Paso sector
has become difficult if not impossible for most migrant workers from Mexico to maintain.
Transnational migrants have become separated from families and homes in Mexico and essentially
have become trapped on the U.S. side where they seek employment. Thus, the interzone in the El
Paso-Juárez region has been transformed. In the context of this thesis I use the term interzone to
refer to a region, city, or particular location within a nation’s borders that is intersected by
transnational forms: individuals; groups; and socio-political-economic activity.
In an increasingly globalized world, borders are not erased, but more types of intersections
and interzones are created and the mobility regime moves in to securitize them. In the current
period, migrants from Juárez to El Paso usually cross by one of several bridges (if they can clear
U.S. Customs) that connect the Juárez-El Paso metroplex. Of course there are unofficial / “illegal”
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means of traversing the Juárez-El Paso border too. After crossing, “immigrants find themselves
largely confined to the El Paso southwest [interzone] as inland border check-points operated by
U.S. Customs and Immigration / Border Patrol [now consolidated under the command of the
Department of Homeland Security] block their movement to the north, east and west of El Paso”
(Nunez and Heyman 2007). Everyone within the El Paso southwest region knows these inland
border check-points are located 70-100 miles outside of El Paso on all highways leading out of the
El Paso southwest. To by-pass these checkpoints would mean trekking across harsh desert and
mountain landscape including millions of acres of U.S. military land in the Tularosa basin, where
trespassers are subject to being shot on sight.
While hunted by law enforcement elements of the mobility / security regimes in the El
Paso sector, undocumented Mexican immigrants, were able to settle in Chaparral, New Mexico essentially quarantined in a desert ghetto - for decades - despite the presence of a dominant White
Euro-American culture that included racists and nativists with deep-rooted tendencies of
discrimination and abuse of Mexican immigrants – because few law enforcement officers regularly
patrolled Chaparral.

Suddenly, in the summer of 2007, Otero County Sheriff’s Deputies, in

coordination with the U.S. Border Patrol under the guise of Homeland Security’s antiterrorism
initiative: Operation Stone Garden (which I detail ahead), in the wake of the so-called “War on
Terror” attacked the Mexican immigrant settlement that had risen in Chaparral for decades.
Being Mannequin-American in Chaparral, New Mexico
I ignored my friends’ warnings and moved to Chaparral, New Mexico in 2003. I didn’t
know anyone in Chaparral when I moved there besides the person who sold me my trailer home
and 3/4 acre of land it was on. For the first couple of months it seemed like I had moved to a
peaceful sanctuary far from the chaos of big cities and all the regulation and law enforcement that
comes with it. Chaparral is an unincorporated town without a city government or city police force
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and in that first couple of months I rarely noticed county sheriff’s department or Border Patrol
vehicles in the community.
In that first couple of months I had just begun to get to know some of my neighbors in my
remote high desert mountain pass sanctuary where I believed I would forever more enjoy hot,
sunny days and perfect, dark, star filled night skies in peace. I bought a lifelike mannequin at a
garage sale in El Paso, Texas, 15 miles to the south of Chaparral. I used the mannequin to model
clothing and accessories I sold on EBay, but I usually kept the mannequin dressed with a Mexican
sombrero, poncho and old blue jeans.
I thought the mannequin was useful for guarding my property as well as modeling on
EBay. During the day I kept the mannequin hidden but at night I would bring him out and place
him somewhere in my yard around my trailer home or newly constructed 15’x 20’ storage structure
(canvas covered carport). I had fenced in a portion of my property near my trailer home and
storage structure with small livestock fencing and bamboo screening. I also had five dogs and two
cats at the time. The dogs and mannequin seemed a good security team.
Then one 2003 summer night I had an eye-opening experience. It happened while working
at my computer and visiting with three new friends from the neighborhood; Marco, Nicky and
Rudy (who I realized many days later were undocumented immigrants from Mexico – who, since
my moving away in 2005 have all been deported along with three other siblings and mother –
leaving a father, grandmother and two youngest siblings behind). It was dark outside, around
9:00pm, calm winds and warm; I was at my desk and computer. My three new friends and I were
talking and watching TV while I messed around with some eBay auction business. Suddenly I
heard a big commotion outside, dogs barking, screaming, and I looked out the window to see my
home surrounded by a dozen Doña Ana and Otero County Sheriff vehicles and deputies prowling
all about! I heard loud shouting and opened my trailer door to see what was going on.
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There was a young sheriff detective, who looked no older than 25, standing in my front
yard, just outside my fence line, ten feet away from my trailer door with his service weapon, a
semi-automatic handgun, drawn and aimed at my mannequin. My mannequin stood in the dark,
inside my fenced yard next to my storage structure, about 30 feet away from the detective. The
detective was shouting: “I TOLD YOU TO GET OVER HERE!” My mannequin stood silent and
refused to respond, seemingly staring back from underneath his sombrero at the detective. I froze
for a few seconds, puzzled, finally, I said to the detective, as calmly as I could: “It’s a dummy…
dummy.”
The detective was still frozen in serious aim upon my mannequin when all the sheriff’s
deputies, over a dozen of them, who had gathered to back-up the detective, burst into laughter, and
began walking back to their cruisers. I heard one deputy say (while chuckling) “see you next
week.” It was Thursday night, the night all law enforcement officers are invited to dine for free at a
Chaparral restaurant called the “El Bayo Steakhouse.” Maybe they had all been eating at El Bayo
when they got a report of an undocumented mannequin in my neighborhood? It was a surreal and
also truly funny Keystone Cop like story, but an example of just how improper policing can get out
of control.
I had said it jokingly, but probably should have not called the detective a “dummy.” I
didn’t know him, and he never did seem to like me much after that. Before he dashed-off, I asked
the embarrassed and rattled detective” what is going on?” He said “we had a report of a prowler in
the neighborhood.” And he asked me “who owns this property?” I told him “I do.” He asked “who
else is in the house?” I said “I have friends over visiting.” I think he wanted to ask me more
questions but didn’t want to risk having to endure the further humiliation of having me possibly
tell him to get lost and leave my mannequin and me alone. I am a white-non-Hispanic man
(“Anglo” in El Paso border lingo) who speaks with a slight Chicagoland-English accent. Things
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may have been different if I had been Latino (“Hispanic” in El Paso border lingo).
In Chaparral, like other colonias, where there is a lack of resources, community services
and governmental assistance - while regularly few law officers are on patrol - there are also not as
many watchdogs for civil rights and human rights abuses as in El Paso, the old “Mecca of the
Southwest.” Out of control police aggression can touch anyone in a place like Chaparral, even a
Mannequin-American. As the events of Operation Stone Garden would un-fold-out-of-control in
the summer of 2007, when large numbers of deputies did go on the hunt for immigrants, human
rights watch dogs would rise against the bullying deputies and Border Patrol agents. Indeed, an
entire network would spring into action; the Border Network for Human Rights (BNHR).
Local Forces of Persecution in Chaparral
As the (above) mannequin story suggests, in Chaparral, which is divided by two New
Mexico counties, the Sheriff’s Departments of Otero County and Doña Ana County have
occasionally joined in joint task force operations (supposedly for crime prevention) long before
they did in 2007, during Homeland Securities anti-terrorist program, named Operation Stone
Garden; which recruited the assistance of both counties sheriff’s departments. The focus of
Operation Stone Garden was supposed to be terrorists and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)
as well as violent Mexican cartel criminals, but in the summer of 2007 the sheriffs instead targeted
settled Mexican immigrant families in Chaparral.
During Operation Stone Garden, some of the people suspected of being undocumented
immigrants, initially detained by Otero County Sheriff’s deputies, were taken to the Doña Ana
County Sheriff’s substation in Chaparral, where Liz Romer, the only full-time sheriff’s employee
in Chaparral either side of the county divide, directed operations as the office administrator and
dispatcher. Romer was typically with several deputies and detectives from Doña Ana County and
Otero County, as well as New Mexico State Highway Patrol officers and Border Patrol (BP)
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officers while they dined together at El Bayo. The food was very good and free, thus attracting
officers from good distances outside Chaparral to El Bayo, where it seemed to me, Liz Romer held
court. I often ate at El Bayo, located at the intersection of Chaparral Road and Paloma Blanca Road
– where their food is very good.
I see Chaparral as operating under both of Shamir’s (2005) “pillars.” Chaparral had long
been unofficially designated by dominant groups outside of it, that is, by federal, state and local
government authorities, police agencies and by U.S. citizens living in El Paso, Texas; as well as in
southern New Mexico communities such as Las Cruces, Alamogordo and other communities near
Chaparral as an open-air prison or desert ghetto where Mexican immigrants were quarantined. An
ICE agent, named Javier, stationed in El Paso, who became my next door neighbor in 2009 (I
moved from Chaparral - back to El Paso in 2005), and have had countless conversations with since,
told me that ICE and Border Patrol agents do not perform regular patrols in Chaparral, and haven’t
for the past decade. The federal government has historically left the settled immigrant population
of Chaparral alone. The biggest exception being during the Operation Stone Garden raids in the
summer of 2007, when, I argue, Sheriff’s deputies pulled BP officers in to take custody of the
immigrants the sheriff's deputies had apprehended.
The larger cities of the sector: El Paso, Las Cruces, Alamogordo; and several smaller
incorporated towns in that border region did have aggressive ICE and Border Patrol activity as well
as city police and sheriff's deputies who possibly would detect the undocumented and did
sometimes perform operations to catch undocumented immigrants. Thus, Chaparral became
perceived by many immigrants as a type of unofficially designated safe haven, relative to these
other more heavily policed and patrolled municipalities. Since the 1980s thousands of Mexican
immigrants came to perceive Chaparral as a safe haven.
When “El Paso Border Patrol Sector Chief Sylvestre Reyes (newly appointed in 1993)
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initiated Operation Blockade / Hold the Line in 1993” (Dunn, 2009) in El Paso, Border Patrol
officers were moved from patrolling largely Hispanic neighborhoods in central El Paso – Border
Patrol officers increased in numbers – and were positioned along the Rio Grande to block
immigrants/migrants passing. This was the precursor to the current construction of massive border
fences/walls and border militarization.
Independently, between 2001 and 2007, El Paso County Sheriff Leo Samaniego initiated
vehicle traffic checkpoints in an effort to apprehend undocumented immigrants. Many migrants
from Mexico were compelled to move to Chaparral in order to avoid detection and in effect
became trapped there. With the help of the Otero County Sheriff’s office, and Operation Stone
Garden funding, the right-wing nativist clique that dominates Chaparral attempted to shift towards
a gated community form in Chaparral by adopting a policy of criminalizing immigrants for
mobility “crimes” and swept them into detention centers in preparation for deportation to Mexico.
This dominant socio-politico-economic clique with economic, ideological, political, nativist and
racist motivations gained encouragement from the “War on Terror” and associated legitimation of
violence.
The Universal Human Rights Regime in the Multi-Scalar Forces of Resistance
The Border Network for Human Rights (BNHR) is the result of decades of human rights
enlightenment and transformation in the El Paso southwest; a network that’s infancy, development
and trajectory Dunn (2009) traces back to the 1992 El Paso high school (Bowie High) lawsuit
against the U.S. Border Patrol and resulting 1994 Operation Blockade/Hold-the-Line by the Border
Patrol in El Paso/Juárez; the genesis of the contemporary massive border wall construction and a
major force behind a citizenship-nationalistic framework of human rights. The BNHR has been
successful in steering human rights protection in the El Paso borderlands into a new framework of
universal human rights that seeks to protect not only legal citizens and residents but also
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undocumented immigrants/migrants, particularly from the abuse (often physical) by authority in
the borderlands.
Dunn (2009) reports that the BNHR was newly formed in 1999 and “started receiving
complaints of Border Patrol harassment and abuses in rural, poor communities [Chaparral is an
example] in late 1999” (p. 169). The BNHR took up the human rights struggle of Mexican
Americans and undocumented immigrants/migrants in the El Paso southwest as earlier, less
organized and less sophisticated human rights organizing Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs), that were important during the Bowie High lawsuit and Operation Blockade debate from
1992-1998, but had waned and disbanded.
Perhaps most notable of the earlier border human rights NGOs was the Border Rights
Coalition (BRC) that was instrumental in stopping Border Patrol abuse of students attending Bowie
High, located in south-central El Paso in a largely Hispanic cluster of neighborhoods. The Bowie
lawsuit, BRC and other NGOs had successfully argued in federal court for the end of Border Patrol
abuse at the high school and adjacent central El Paso neighborhoods, where physical abuse of
undocumented immigrants/migrants and Mexican Americans at the hands of Border Patrol officers
had run wild for decades. The Bowie lawsuit had focused on the human rights of Mexican
American citizens and others of officially legal status, essentially excluding the undocumented
immigrants/migrants from consideration during the El Paso community human rights debate in the
early to mid-1990s. Ironically, before the BNHR emerged, the Bowie lawsuit was the driving force
behind the El Paso Border Patrol Sector Chief’s, Silvestre Reyes decision to implement Operation
Blockade/Hold-the-Line. Blockading the border replaced patrolling Bowie High and the adjacent
neighborhoods as the Border Patrol strategy in El Paso. The BRC took the next step in the
evolution of regional resistance, shifting from a “rights of U.S. citizens” framework to a universal
human rights framework that included people of all legal statuses, advocating against Reyes’
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initiated border wall. However, the BRC’s methods centered on a small group of advocates with
periodic visits to communities, rather than achieving effective outreach and self-organizing within
communities.
In 1994 new border fencing sprung up between central El Paso and Juárez, and Border
Patrol officers were moved from patrolling El Paso neighborhoods to stationary locations along the
river, essentially stopping unauthorized migration in large part. Dunn (2009) points out, according
to Border Patrol official estimates, prior to operation Blockade - “65 percent of the undocumented
border crossers in El Paso were local commuters from Juárez” (p. 86). The other 35% were
typically migrants who traveled from greater distances in Mexico’s interior and did not commute
back and forth daily but usually returned home to families in Mexico after the completion of
seasonal agricultural work on farms and ranches in the U.S.
In other words, before Operation Blockade in 1994, 65 percent of undocumented crossing
in El Paso was circular migration between Juárez and El Paso, consisting mainly of day workers to
El Paso who performed services in housekeeping (maids), agriculture, lawn care, restaurants, and
assortment of other labor intensive jobs - before returning in the evenings to their families in
Juárez. Blockading the border took Border Patrol abuses out of El Paso neighborhoods and schools
but had the effect of socially constructing those blocked out; the migrant workers from Juárez, into
the “other” and created an “us” (Mexican Americans) and “them” (undocumented Mexican
migrants) paradigm never really known before in El Paso. While improving the human rights
protection of Mexican Americans, the unintended consequence of the Bowie lawsuit was to
diminish the status and human rights concerns for non-citizen/undocumented Mexican
immigrants/migrants.
Dunn (2009) reports that while Border Patrol abuse did decrease in central El Paso after the
Bowie lawsuit, immigrant deaths in the El Paso sector rose significantly due to “drowning in the
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border river and canals, or environmental exposure” (p. 89-90) because the expanding border
fence/wall pushed undocumented migrants into dangerous water crossing attempts or harsh desert
crossings west of El Paso. And Dunn (2009) found that Border Patrol abuse pushed out to remote
areas of El Paso County and New Mexico (to the west and north); “small, poor communities in the
Rio Grande Valley of southern New Mexico, south of Las Cruces, but well north of the border, as
well as in the outlying areas of east El Paso County” (p. 169). These remote locations outside
central El Paso have experienced growing numbers of vulnerable migrants, who, trapped by the
blockading of the border attempt to settle in colonias, such as in Chaparral (as well as in Sunland
Park, New Mexico, “Colonia Lejana in East El Paso County” [Dunn 2009, p. 169], Anthony, Texas
and Anthony, New Mexico, Berino, New Mexico, etc…) and where human rights watch dog
NGOs had yet organized effectively.
Dunn (2009) says that particularly alarming were reports of Border Patrol agents forcibly
entering homes without permission or warrants, as well as establishing of temporary checkpoints
just outside communities” (p. 169). Other familiar abuses and extreme acts were reported:
“aggressive and harassing questioning, verbal abuse, physical abuse (typically mild), and even one
school apprehension of parents” (p. 169). But a new human rights network (BNHR) was forming
out of El Paso and would grow to reach out to the vulnerable and abused attempting settlement in
the remote, outlying colonias. Since its conception in 1999, the BNHR has dedicated its service to
including undocumented immigrants/migrants in the struggle to protect human rights and human
well-being.1
The BNHR began to respond to the abuse reports with strategies and tactics that “led to
greater involvement by residents of affected communities, leading to community organizing – in
contrast to past practices (by the BRC). The Border Patrol eventually responded more
1

Josiah Heyman, a mentor on my thesis committee and Chair of the University of Texas at El Paso’s Department of
Sociology and Anthropology is the current (2013) Border Network for Human Rights Board of Directors President.
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constructively to abuses documented and publicized by BNHR REPORTS, evolving toward a
position of seeking dialogue to hear communities’ concerns – and also modifying some
questionable practices” (p. 169-70). In short, the Border Patrol in the El Paso sector, being media
conscious, and lawsuit leery, aware of the formable development of the BNHR and its litigators,
began more seriously to avoid incidences of immigrant abuse and started to engage in a more
constructive dialogue with immigrant human rights advocates; mainly the BNHR and its growing
number of community based organizers.
In the beginning (1999), the BNHR was overwhelmed with abuse reports and its attempts
to respond to the more remote, distant communities, since it had very few resources and the travel
distances to the distant communities from El Paso. Dunn (2009) says that initially the BNHR had
only “one part-time staff and sparsely outfitted office” (p. 170). Gradually and steadily the BNHR
grew and a greater number of staff members were able to go out, talk to informants, record
episodes from residents, and offer them “know your rights” educational sessions. Dunn (2009) says
this was similar to previous BRC efforts, except staffers “went directly to communities, which
were quite far from BNHR offices, and maintained contact with them afterward as well” (p. 170).
In 2000 and 2001 “the BNHR coordinator [Fernando Garcia] adopted a model focused more on
training interested community members to be “promotoras/promotores de derechos [rights
promoters]” in afflicted communities” (p. 170). These people were residents in the communities
available to record abuses and educate their neighbors on rights. In Chaparral, the Catholic Church
and a flock of its nuns, amongst others, have become solid and effective instruments in this
endeavor.
Next, “the BNHR formed human rights committees in each community where rights
promoters were active, and eventually a regional council with representatives from each
community committee” (Dunn 2009, p. 170). The BNHR soon became a force to be reckoned with
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– effectively using the media; garnering a number of community and political allies as well as the
services of very capable human rights litigators. The BNHR and their attorneys at the Paso del
Norte Civil Rights Project represented the immigrants in Chaparral quickly and very effectively
after the Operation Stone Garden raids began in the summer of 2007.
“By 2003 BNHR included fifty-three human rights promoters, eleven human rights
community-based committees in southern New Mexico and in El Paso County, and two regional
coordinators (one for southern New Mexico and one for El Paso) – resulting in an estimated eight
to nine hundred people organized and reached through the committee members, promoters, and
members of their families” (Dunn 2009, p. 170). In time, certainly by the summer of 2007 and
Operation Stone Garden, the BNHR would be tasked in new ways. The 2001 9/11 terror attacks,
ensuing so-called “War on Terror” and associated Legitimation of Violence (LOV) provided fuel
in terms of fear and hatred of suspicious strangers – and new excuses for racists, nativists, sheriff’s
departments and Border Patrol officers; multi-scalar forces of persecution - to abuse and violate
the human rights of undocumented immigrants/migrants.
And others who can be considered elements of multi-scalar forces of resistance would rise
against them: human rights advocates, liberals and progressives rose to protect the immigrants. We
should also consider that multi-scalar forces of resistance includes the poor, the confused, the
homeless; vulnerable young people labeled only as “gang members”; drug users, drug addicts and
drug smugglers who are typically labeled by many others as “scum” and “dirt”- but are in fact,
human beings attempting to cope, and also resist persecution in the borderlands.
Mexican Immigrants, Migrants and Transnationals in Chaparral, New Mexico
“Over a thousand years ago, “Mansos”, “Sumas” and other Native Americans, and later
“Apache”, “Kiowa” and “Comanche” migrated back and forth with the seasons throughout the
vicinity” (Sonnichsen 1968, p. 19-25 and also based on field notes from conversations with UTEP
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cultural anthropologist Howard Campbell, Ph.D., [Tribal Anthropologist for the “Piros, Mansos,
Tiwas” (PMT) of Las Cruces, New Mexico] and UTEP archaeologist David Carmichael, Ph.D.) .
For over a hundred years the area was a ranching community, and is still partially so today, with
horses, goats, chickens, roosters and cattle on any number of properties. The people of Chaparral
tend to be an unusual, tough and varied lot. Some are drifters to the borderlands, who came seeking
to be left alone and do their own thing in their own time, or came in the hope of establishing safe
settlement for family in the belief that Chaparral would be an obliging place. In time many were
born into the Chaparral community.
According to local residents and U.S. census data, Chaparral’s population boomed in the
1990s and into the early years of the new millennium. No doubt, many perceived it as an
affordable quiet place, away from the hustle and bustle of the city, government, police and Border
Patrol. It is apparent that thousands of Mexican immigrants, perhaps feeling unwelcome and
hunted by the security regime so thick on the ground elsewhere in the El Paso southwest, were
attracted to Chaparral. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents largely ignored the
immigrants who had already landed and were attempting to settle in Chaparral (based on field
notes of conversations with ICE agents, including my next door neighbor in El Paso), as long as
the immigrants didn’t stray outside of “Chapa-town” as Chaparral is often called by the locals.
In my personal experience, I find that for those with cash up front, land is cheap in
Chaparral. Otherwise, the developers and finance companies gouge buyers with usurious interest
charges that can take a lifetime to pay off. However monthly mortgage payments are manageable
at around $300.00 (the rate I paid) and many, including myself, believed that they had moved to a
peaceful, safe place.
Transnationalism in Chaparral
Immigrants and transnationals from Mexico often cross the border with the help of human
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smugglers known as “coyotes.” The coyotes direct their movements from Juárez into El Paso or
other communities that straddle the Rio Grande and border west and east of El Paso – such as from
the Valley of Juárez across the border to El Paso Lower Valley locations near towns, such as
Tornillo, Texas (more so since Operation Blockade/Hold-the-Line took effect in 1994). If the
immigrants can make it safely across the international boundary in the lower valley it is relatively
easier to transfer by vehicle to Chaparral, which is located less than an hour away from the border
in the lower valley and elsewhere near El Paso. But still, immigrants are at risk of being
intercepted by Border Patrol officers, sheriffs and other law enforcement officers on patrol or at
random check points for “proof of insurance” and sometimes for “immigration status” as former El
Paso Sheriff Leo Samaniego did between 2001 and 2007.
The BNHR and other human rights NGOs did confront Samaniego on his immigration
policing policies - and effectively caused him to back off from hunting undocumented immigrants.
The current El Paso County Sheriff, Sheriff Richard Wiles is a strong advocate of protecting
immigrant human rights in the community policing model he embraces. Sheriff Wiles believes the
community is better served and safer if immigrants, including the undocumented, are not afraid to
seek police protection from real crime, such as rape, battery, burglary and murder; or to cooperate
with police investigations of these matters of real crime and abuse. Staudt (2008) details how the
El Paso human rights community confronted Sheriff Samaniego - and how later, Sheriff Wiles was
elected. Sheriff Wiles was the El Paso City Police Chief before election to El Paso County Sheriff
in 2008.
Transnational Family Trips and Vacations
It is common for coyotes/human smugglers to hold immigrants/transnationals captive in
Lower Valley locations until family members or friends in Chaparral can bring ransom money,
which may range from a few hundred dollars to thousands of dollars. I witnessed a family, my
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neighbors in Chaparral, go through this ordeal. Their mother, her two youngest sons, and her
brother had gone to Chihuahua to visit relatives for Easter. On their return they were robbed,
beaten and abandoned in Juárez by the first group of coyotes they paid. They met another group of
coyotes who crossed them into the U.S. near Tornillo. There they were held captive and allowed to
call family members in Chaparral, who were told that they had one hour to get to Tornillo with
$500.00 or they would never see their four family members again.
I observed as the captive women’s oldest son, my friend, “Marco,” collected money from
neighborhood friends in Chaparral, and begged another neighbor who owned a mini-van to help
retrieve his family members. I rode with Marco and observed (from across the parking lot) his
meeting with a mysterious man one hour later and 50 miles away at a gas station in Tornillo.
Then, we followed the mystery man by vehicle to an isolated farm property between Tornillo and
the Rio Grande where the family members were being held. The land was likely not the property of
the coyotes, and the coyotes’ activity there was likely unknown to the actual property owner.
Marco’s family members were released after a tense exchange of $500. The family members made
the trip safely back to Chaparral.
Transnational community forces are at play. Family, business and friendships connect
people from both sides of the border in a society weighted down by national boundaries and all the
legalities that accompany it. Social Scientists who specialize in immigration and borderland
communities have reported on the fear that undocumented Mexican immigrants have of police and
Border Patrol. Dunn (2009), Heyman, Nunez and Talavera, (2010), and Heyman (2010) show
through ethnographies in the El Paso borderlands that the Mexican immigrants’ greatest fears are
to be caught by authorities and deported, thus dividing their families and destroying their economic
survival strategies, and possibly subjecting them to other kinds of cruel, inhumane treatment. The
immigrants are constantly in fear and in hiding; usually only risking movement around the
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community when necessary for travel to work, school, or the store for provisions to survive.
Otherwise, they tend to stay locked-up in their homes out of the view of law enforcement or others
who may inform on them. I found this to be the general practice of the Mexican immigrants of
Chaparral.
Immigrant families fear the gangs of boys in Chaparral but are more afraid of the sheriffs,
Border Patrol, and ICE agents. The immigrant families cannot go to the authorities for help for fear
of family members being detained and deported. Other U.S. citizens prey on the immigrants as
well. Ranchers, restaurant owners, agroindustry, construction contractors and other business
operators hire undocumented immigrants and pay them sub-minimum wages. Sometimes they
don’t pay them at all. Other predators are interested in things the immigrants can give them besides
hard work. I know of one case in which a 26 year old Chaparral woman intimidated a mixed-status
immigrant family into allowing her to marry their 15 year old son who she had seduced.
Population, “Race”, Ethnicity and Demographics in Chaparral
El Paso’s population is over 700,000; while Juárez is about twice that size with over 1.5
million people. In the shadow of the El Paso-Juárez metroplex, Chaparral’s population is
comparatively tiny, estimated roughly at 20,000. The 2010 U.S. Census set Chaparral’s population
at 14,631, but only the Doña Ana county side is a census-designated place (CDP). The Otero
county side is nearly as populated as the Doña Ana side but was not counted in large part. When
including both sides of the Doña Ana-Otero county line Chaparral is easily over 20,000 people. As
of the 2000 U.S. census, the racial make-up of the CDP was said to be 70.69% White (with most
Hispanics or Latinos counted as White), 1.26% African American, 1.29% Native American, 0.43%
Asian, 0.18% Pacific Islander, 21.38% from other races, and 4.77% from two or more races. The
2000 census did report that Hispanics or Latinos of any race amounted to 64.49% of the
population. When added to the Otero County side, the Hispanic or Latino total for all of Chaparral
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is well over that percentage, and, in actuality, probably in excess of 80%. The official, although
misleading, U.S. Census figures for Chaparral are a benefit to real estate agents and members of
the Chaparral Community Development Association (CCDA), who seek to attract a more affluent
Anglo population to Chaparral. The Chaparral Community Development Association (CCDA) and
real estate brokers like to refer to Chaparral as a “bedroom community” of El Paso. While that term
may characterize a small portion of Chaparral, the majority of Chaparral is more adequately
described as a colonia resembling a giant trailer park, with little resources or community protection
from crime and abuse.
Geography, Landscape, Property, Community Demographics
Chaparral is surrounded by desert and beautiful mountains, but the town itself is chaotic
and sprawling. Chaparral is not a traditional town, village or suburb. While there are
concentrations of businesses there is no real "downtown.” Chaparral is mostly mobile homes with
old ranch properties and businesses, both formal and informal thrown into the mix; there are
several convenience stores, a grocery store, a number of auto repair places and junkyards, a few
budget franchise outlets. There is no post office (only subcontractor locations). Much of the
community, including, the immigrants, engage in informal market practices as survival strategies.
A few churches on both sides of the county line - and several schools - all located on the Doña Ana
County side of town, are the only signs of community hope in Chaparral. There are no schools on
the Otero side of town. Life in Chaparral is like life on Native American Indian nations, with high
levels of poverty and despair. Gang tags are spray painted throughout the area, trash blows about in
the hot desert wind, and miscellaneous junk rusts in piles in the yards of trailer homes.
The fact that a great number of the Chaparral community are working-poor Mexican
immigrants, many of whom are of undocumented immigration status, or living in mixed status
households, one might question why real estate agents and the CCDA don’t mention this fact but
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instead attempt to attract more affluent Anglos to settle there. One may conclude that economics,
racism and politics guide many to sweep the truth about Chaparral’s demographics under the
proverbial rug. Indeed, some in Chaparral wish to sweep the Mexican immigrant community all the
way across the border into Mexico. When violence is legitimated at the national level by wars,
human life in general is cheapened.
When life has little value, profit is sought in the destruction or removal of vulnerable
strangers by dominant groups who desire what they believe they can gain by removing the
strangers; in this case the winnings are the immigrants’ real property and lucrative federal funding
(Operation Stone Garden) for the Sheriff and his deputies. There is a long history in the United
States of dominant groups dehumanizing and “dis-appearing” others in order to appropriate their
real estate. This is clearly a factor in the Chaparral case, as members of the dominant group in
Chaparral encouraged the Otero Sheriff’s deputies to perform immigration sweeps. Real estate
agents, real estate developers, real estate investors, nativists and White racists join in the multiscalar forces of persecution with local, state, and federal law enforcement as elements of the
mobility regime in Chaparral.
The unincorporated town of Chaparral, with over twenty thousand human inhabitants - split
roughly 60/40 between two New Mexico counties at the New Mexico/Texas state line - surrounded
by military and BLM land and located less than twenty miles from the international border
between El Paso and Juárez - makes for a confusing community with various intersecting borders
delineating different county sheriff and government jurisdictions – different state police
jurisdiction – and different inter-federal police and military jurisdictions.
On the outskirts of El Paso on the road north to Chaparral there is little but mountain,
desert, cattle ranches, BLM land, U.S. military land, an electric power plant, and the El Paso city
landfill/dumps. Once across the state line there is some good land in Chaparral as well as good
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water too, and plenty of it, supplied by underground wells at the south end of the Tularosa Basin.
Chaparral straddles the county line of two New Mexico counties: Otero and Doña Ana,
which are delineated by “County Line Road,” running north and south through the town. The Doña
Ana County seat is located 40 miles to the northwest in Las Cruces, New Mexico; while the Otero
County seat is 70 miles northeast in Alamogordo, New Mexico. Thus, the two sides of Chaparral
are differentiated both by the two county sheriff’s departments and by different gangs of boys. On
the Otero County side the "sport" of cockfighting was legal until 2008.
Another border in Chaparral is its southern boundary, the state line between Texas and New
Mexico. Add to the various boundary lines the fact that Chaparral is also bounded to its north and
east by the largest military training and weapons proving ground in the world, consisting of Fort
Bliss, Biggs Air Base, McGregor Range, White Sands Missile Range and Holloman Air Base
which occupy most of the Tularosa Basin from El Paso to Alamogordo and beyond -as well as the
proximity of the El Paso-Juárez international border and Chaparral becomes a truly strange and
confusing place. Trespassers on military land that borders Chaparral are subject to being shot on
sight as it is a totally militarized zone that covers millions of acres in the Tularosa Basin adjacent
to Chaparral to the north and east.
Ecology of Chaparral including Major Events in U.S. Legitimation of Violence
Juárez-El Paso, are giant metropolises in comparison to tiny Chaparral, which is almost
forgotten and hidden in the desert amongst the physical shadows of the Franklin Mountain’s most
northern summits and the socio-economic shadows of the El Paso-Juárez border juggernaut. El
Paso and Chaparral are both experiencing steady population, residential and infrastructure growth.
El Paso urban sprawl is steadily creeping north along the east slopes and arroyos of the Franklin
Mountains, moving closer to the Texas / New Mexico state line, which Chaparral, New Mexico
lays tied to on the north side. Chaparral is blocked by the state line from sprawling out into Texas
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and El Paso County. And the state line blocks Chaparral from having little, if any control over
what the state of Texas, city of El Paso or private industry does to the land south of the state line.
No doubt, over the last few hundred years, many people, and passing of events have had a
hand in what El Paso or Chaparral have become today. But, in terms of the current ecological
consequences facing Chaparral in particular, it was the expansion of United States Military bases
and weapons testing proving grounds into the Tularosa Basin that doomed Chaparral to be
designated as “South of the North” and even “south of the south of the north.”
I use the terms North-South or global north communities and global south communities as
political ecologists such as Pellow (2007) use to designate global North nations and global South
nations. As Pellow (2007) explained: “I use the term global South mainly as a social – rather than
strictly geographic – designation meant to encompass politically and economically vulnerable
communities, and also communities of color and poor communities in industrialized nations within
the “South” designation (or what some observers call “the South of the North”) and privileged
communities in poor nations within the “North” designation (or the “North of the South”) (p. 2-3).
In this sense, we can say that Chaparral is “south” of El Paso which is “the South of the
North”, because Chaparral has become a place that the city of El Paso dumps garbage and toxic
industries on. It is also a place that Mexican immigrants have in fact become un-officially
quarantined in. Whole big sections of neighborhoods in Chaparral have become a sort of desert
ghetto for Mexican immigrants of documented and undocumented status, or of mixed-status
households. In geographical terms, the unincorporated town of Chaparral, New Mexico is
physically around fifteen miles north of El Paso, Texas. For social and ecological designation, I say
Chaparral is a million miles south of sustainability, as is El Paso, because both Chaparral and El
Paso are tied together and locked on course for wide-spread, devastating, ecological and humanhealth disaster in the not too distant future, or perhaps, even in their immediate future.
52

In fact, the disaster began many decades ago, during World War Two when “Lieut.
Colonel Harold (“Hal”) Turner” (Metz, 1989 p. 148) of the United States Army-Air Force selected
White Sands, New Mexico and most of the surrounding Tularosa Basin as a location for the testing
of the most top secret and horrific of weapons ever used on human populations; the Atomic Bomb.
The U.S. Military already had bombing and gunnery ranges near opposite ends of the Tularosa
Basin; at Fort Bliss and Biggs Air Base next to El Paso, Texas near the south rim of the basin,
along the northeast slopes of the Franklin Mountains; and about 70 miles north of El Paso, close to
the north rim of the basin, at the Alamogordo Bombing and Gunnery Range.
In addition to ecological impact from the U.S. Department of Defense on Chaparral - El
Paso, Texas, the state of Texas, high impact industrial corporations, and El Paso residents, have for
decades dumped garbage in landfills within the TCEQ designated “Landfill Land” zone. Type 1
landfills in the state of Texas allow solid municipal waste. There is a type 1 El Paso City un-lined
landfill on McCombs Road, at the state line, right next to Chaparral. Directly across McCombs
Road from the El Paso Landfill is another dump, often proposed as a place to dispose of industrial
and military toxic waste from cities and states far away from Chaparral.
This second dump has been used by the El Paso Electric Company’s Newman Power Plant
(see below) and likely other corporations, as well as the U.S. military and private citizens as a
place to dump in, often in the past illegally. Dating back to before World War Two, soldiers
stationed at Fort Bliss, next to El Paso and Chaparral trained at artillery ranges along the northeast
side of the Franklin Mountains, including around the current location of the landfill land.
Additionally, the El Paso Electric Company located its Newman Power Plant (one mile from
Chaparral) adjacent to the landfill land, on Stan Roberts Drive, near its intersection with McCombs
Road, on the dumps’ south side.
The Newman Power Plant supplies electricity to El Paso customers and residents and
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businesses of other cities and towns in the region, including Chaparral. Furthermore, the Texas
Commission of Environmental Quality (TCEQ) permitted a large quarry, owned by Stanley Jobe to
operate on the northeast slope of the Franklin Mountains a few miles directly above the Newman
Power Plant, the landfill Land and Chaparral. The state line near Chaparral has long been
designated as a place for Texas and El Paso to dump waste and locate harmful industry. And
Chaparral has long been designated as a place for Mexican immigrants, documented and
undocumented to be quarantined in a desert ghetto/colonia.
The military, long ago designated the land around Chaparral as a place to test weapons.
Today the landfill land area looks like a war-zone-hell scape that suggests something like several
tank battles and explosions, death and destruction. Dark, black slag and sludge piles dominate
several dozen acres of torn and pitted, rocky, sandy desert. I argue that El Paso is “the South of the
North” as it has been designated by more dominant regions of the country as a place of
contamination and toxicity at the edge of the global north, and therefore, Chaparral can be
considered “South of the South of the North.”
I see the dumping of garbage and toxic waste as well as the testing of weapons of mass
destruction such as atomic bombs and radioactive missiles as other forms of violence that have
been legitimated by the government’s model of war. That first atomic bomb test 100 miles north of
Chaparral was more than the beginning of designating the Tularosa Basin and Chaparral as a place
to crash rockets and dump on – it marks the time that American minds started to be significantly
more contaminated with legitimation of violence. It has come full-circle with the attack on the
immigrant families of Chaparral in the summer of 2007.
“Most Americans believe the U.S. missile program started when the Army grabbed 118
German Rocketmen (Rocket Scientists) during the end of World War II. Actually the program was
well underway in 1943 with a government contract for missile development with the California
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Institute of Technology; the institute combined with Army Ordnance to form ORDCIT” (Metz,
1989 p.147). Late in 1944, ORDICT had rockets ready to go but needed a large proving ground to
test them. “The Army had been trying to acquire additional land in New Mexico alongside the Fort
Bliss firing ranges, property acquisitions (were) incomplete” (Metz, 1989 p. 147-148). Therefore,
the first short-range test missiles, “Private A’s”, were tested by ORDCIT in the California Mojave
Desert at Camp Irwin Reservation. By 1945, ORDCIT was ready to fire bigger rockets and moved
to the Tularosa Basin. ORDCIT “occupied the Bliss antiaircraft ranges at Hueco, Doña Ana,
Orogrande and Alamogordo Bombing Range” (Metz, 1989 p. 148). By April of 1945, ORDCIT
was firing rockets in the Tularosa Basin they called Private F’s,” “a modification of the California
missiles” (Metz, 1989 p. 148).
Soon after the Private F’s were tested, ORDCIT developed sophisticated, long-range
artillery missile called the “Corporal” (Metz, 1989 p. 148). Along with the capture of several
German missile experts, it had confiscated rail carloads of V-2 missile parts and shipped them to
the United States. Late in 1944 a team of government, military and scientific experts were
evaluating various national test sites. El Centro, California was originally considered. But the State
Department needed to convince our neighbor to the south, Mexico, to agree to let the U.S. Army
fire missiles over its territory. Mexico was not agreeable and this international complication made
El Centro unfeasible.
“Hawk-nosed Lieut. Harold R. Turner, a leader of the team and a man who would become
the first White Sands commander, convinced his associates of New Mexico’s virtues, namely the
Tularosa Basin between the Sacramento Mountains on the east and the San Andres and Organ
Mountains on the west” (Metz, 1989 p. 148). The Tularosa Basin was chosen for its “moderate
climate, nearly unlimited visibility, and sparse population” (Metz, 1989 p. 148). And no doubt,
because it was far from major American populations, besides, El Paso, which many in the U.S.
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typically conceptualize as Mexico, or at the far edge of the U.S. and place to dump on.
Furthermore, shameful as it is, many U.S. citizens, who even know their geography –
could care less about the people of Juárez and Mexico. The legitimation of violence is so deeply
planted into American minds from the country’s government’s long history of war and destruction
of other peoples, especially “brown” or “dark” skinned people that few would give a second
thought to detonating A-Bombs on the border if they thought their lives depended on it. In the
collective American consciousness – the edge of the country is the preferred place to destroy the
ecology. As the border wall along the country’s southern edge has become the solution to terrorism
and securing safety at the expense of border communities in the minds of an alarming number of
people in the U.S. – so too do many think the edge is the place to dump.
The U.S. military did fire missiles, some containing radioactive material such as Cobalt 57
into the floor of the Tularosa Basin – and into Mexico accidently but a known risk beforehand.
The government figured, in the Tularosa Basin the missiles could be recovered with the lessened
possibility of civilian injuries and civilian private eyes. But, things have not always gone as
planned and there have been serious unintended consequences, and no doubt there are many still
unknown. “On May 29, 1947, a German scientist wired a gyroscope backwards on a four-and-onehalf-ton experimental V-2. It lifted off and, instead of heading north, went south; Five minutes later
it impacted a mile and a half south of Juárez” (Metz, 1989 p. 156).
There have been several other alarming missile mishaps associated with White Sands
Missile Range and other testing sites nearby, and Metz (1989 p. 157-158) details the most publicly
known, including the most disastrous missile failure that is known to the public. It occurred in July
of 1970 when an Air Force Athena, a four-stage research missile used to study re-entry
phenomenon, left Green River, Utah, headed for White Sands. Catastrophically, it struck near
Torreon, Mexico after the four stage (missile) prematurely ignited. The military reported the
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missile smashed in an “uninhabited desert” and buried itself in the sand. However, the missile
contained a couple vials of Cobalt 57 for “experimental purposes,” which when revealed to the
Mexicans made them “very indignant and frustrated.” Mexico wanted to investigate the crash site
but did not have the facilities or personnel and reluctantly allowed the State Department permission
to check the site with their detection equipment. Several yards of earth were reported to be
radioactive and the Americans removed fifty-five barrels of dirt and stored them at White Sands,
where they are today, along with lots of other radioactive and toxic dirt that have been removed
from multiple impacts in the Tularosa Basin.
I doubt it, but maybe nobody was affected by the radioactive missile disaster in Torreon,
and maybe the State Department cleaned up all the radioactive soil at the crash site. But that
radioactive soil still sits somewhere on the White Sands Missile Range land with tons of more
radioactive and toxic soil produced from testing atomic bombs, radioactive missiles, depleted
uranium tipped tank rounds and other weapons of mass destruction. For the most part, the Tularosa
Basin looks clean and pristine throughout when viewed via satellite, from airplane, mountain-top,
or on an automobile drive through it on Highways 70 (from Las Cruces to Alamogordo) or 54
(from El Paso to Alamogordo).
What are the long term consequences of all the rocket tests in the basin? What is in the sand
that blows about and is often seen on hot summers spiraling high into the sky as “dust-devils”?
What is in the water below the sand? According to Metz (1989), by 1982, “after 35 years of firings
in the Tularosa Basin there had been 32,000 missile launches. And they haven’t stopped firing
them by any means yet. The number of missiles, bombs and artillery shells tested in the Tularosa
Basin continues to climb, especially with the need to develop more weapons and train more
soldiers for recent wars and those that are planned in the future. And the destructive force of the
weapons classified as conventional has increased greatly since the first missiles were fired in the
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basin in the 1940s.
Still, there has been nothing as horrific and destructive as the first atomic bomb, exploded
at White Sands. There were lots of unintended consequences from that event. Entire communities
that ended-up in the path of the radioactive dust cloud fall-out were contaminated and turned into
ghost towns. Cancer rates of citizens from those communities soared. And perhaps it is just a
coincidence, but a lot of people around the Tularosa Basin, and El Paso for that matter are inflicted
with cancer.
On July 16, 1945 in the Jornada del Muerto (Journey of Death) desert about 35 miles
southeast of Socorro, New Mexico, at the massive White Sands Proving Ground, which was new,
and recently developed in secrecy by the U.S. government, the first detonation of a nuclear device,
or “Gadget” as it was nicknamed, or “Trinity” as it was code named, or “Atomic-Bomb” as it
became commonly known, took place. Up until the 1940s, when the U.S. military seized White
Sands, as well as most of the rest of the Tularosa Basin to test the first Atomic Bomb, test missiles
and many more weapons of mass destruction since - the Tularosa Basin was full of ranches, Native
Americans and their sacred sites - from El Paso to Alamogordo and beyond.
The U.S. government/Department of Defense kicked all the ranchers and everybody else
out of much of the basin due to the exigencies of war, and today, White Sands Missile Range is
roughly one hundred miles long and forty miles wide, stretching north-to-south from an area of the
basin north of the Trinity Site and northwest of Alamogordo, NM to just north of El Paso, right up
to the point where Chaparral lies. Only a dozen or so acres of buffer zone; off-limits Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) land, separates Chaparral from restricted military land that a person can
be shot on sight for entering; or blown-up by stepping on unspent artillery in the sand, or a rocket
or tank shell from the military’s nearby McGregor Range, or White Sands Missile Range.
Holloman Air Force Base is within the boundary and officially part of White Sands Missile Range.
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What of the Tularosa Basin that is not part of White Sands Missile Range is largely part of
the Fort Bliss Military Reservation, including: Fort Bliss; Biggs Army Air Field; the huge
McGregor Range; and most of the land in the basin parallel to the White Sands Missile Range –
stretching from El Paso, past Chaparral’s east side, and continuing about 65 miles farther north,
near Alamogordo. “The Fort Bliss Military Reservation includes 1,130,000 acres. The property,
part owned and part leased, is roughly seventy-five miles long and fifty-four miles wide. Fort Bliss
has been elevated by the federal government and military to a premiere Army Base; considered
essential for training soldiers and testing weapons for future wars of the 21st century. Neither Fort
Bliss nor White Sands Missile Range is going to be leaving the Tularosa Basin as long as the
United States military is believed to be needed to fight in wars around the globe.
Before the military took over the Tularosa Basin, Chaparral had not been damned from the
north or much from the south (geographically and socially) - by El Paso and Texas – but are so
today by El Paso and Texas landfills (both toxic and Type 1 municipal garbage dumps). Also, the
Newman Power Plant – owned by El Paso Electric – is located a mile away from Chaparral. El
Paso Electric cleans the power plant’s turbines with highly cancerous solvents and dumps the
sludge byproduct in a landfill between the plant and Chaparral. El Paso Electric claims the solvents
are neutralized by the suns radiation – but if these highly toxic chemicals seep into the groundwater
below Chaparral they can never be filtered out to effectively avoid inflicting humans with cancer
who drink the water.
In the 1940s, the U.S. military doomed Chaparral from the north (geographically and
socially). As the missiles fired at White Sands reached further into space, the German and
American rocket scientists had more and more successes, needed more and more land – and this
meant displacing people. Metz (1989) describes the mood and circumstances of the Tularosa Basin
ranchers as the U.S. Department of Defense made plans to seize millions of acres of land in the
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basin and remove any rancher who would not evacuate what was about to become restricted U.S.
Department of Defense property:
“Public hearings took place in Las Cruces, New Mexico, the government patiently explaining how
it needed additional property to protect the liberty of those who were being displaced. The
independent, tobacco-chewing cowmen had spent lifetimes battling blizzards, drought, Indians, big
outfits and sheepherders. These ranchers had stood alone against the world, never asking for
assistance, fearing only the banker and possibly God. They were a quiet, law-abiding bunch who,
in the twilight of their lives, with some notable exceptions, possessed little but a worn-out pick-up,
a few skinny cattle, a mortgage, and several sections of desert which until now nobody wanted.
Pride and patriotism wouldn’t let them shoot it out with the government, so the Department of
Defense expropriated ranches and homes as bewildered, weather-beaten old cowhands stood by,
“too tough to cry and too choked up to talk” (p. 154).
Jimmy Bowen, deceased in 2012, was the largest rancher (really more of an industrialist
who dealt in heavy equipment and machinery) around Chaparral. Bowen’s son still owns ‘Bowen
Industries’, the ‘Edge of Texas’ steak house, and the ‘Bowen Ranch’ with grazing access for his
cattle to the thousands of acres of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land that surrounds
Chaparral. Beyond the BLM land are millions of more acres of military land: Fort Bliss, Biggs
Army Airfield, McGregor Range, Whites Sands Missile Range, Holloman Air Force Base, and the
rest of the Tularosa Basin. It is a dry, sandy, rocky basin populated largely by rattlesnakes, rabbits,
coyotes, Oryx (large, sharp-horned and aggressive herbivores introduced in the 1950s from Africa
by New Mexico Game Wardens and U.S. Military Officers seeking big game trophy hunting),
cactus and other prickly, sharp vegetation.
Bob Mitchell controls the well water for most of Chaparral on both sides of the county line.
He owns the ‘Lake Section Water Company’ and supplies good tasting running water to most of
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the residents. I hope it truly is good healthy water too. More than anything else, available water has
brought people to the Chaparral high desert. Most colonias have drinking water problems and
water shortages, but not Chaparral; and the more people who move to Chaparral the more paying
customers the water company gains. Land speculators bought huge tracts of ranch and desert land
on both sides of the county line and subdivided it into half-acre and three-quarter-acre lots for
trailer homes. Generally the rule is no more than two trailer homes on any single lot. Many
families live in doublewide trailer homes but most lots only have a single trailer. Neighborhoods
of trailer homes sprawl across Chaparral amongst the sand hills and mesquite. There are also
several large homes on larger properties almost hidden in plain sight. Some are more like
fortresses, giant native stone structures with intimidating high walls and heavy duty steel gates.
And running water is available to everyone in Chaparral who pays Bob Mitchell and his water
company.

The Society of Chaparral
There are also grocery stores; medical clinics; veterinarians; plumbers; auto mechanics; gas
stations; convenience stores; heavy equipment contractors; restaurants; automobile-wrecker yards;
Insurance agencies ; real estate brokers; and propane gas distributors. In addition there are also a
number of informal family businesses run out of trailer homes all over Chaparral. Mixed in among
the thousands of residential trailer homes are auto-mechanic businesses, auto-body-repair/paint
shops, puppy mills, beauty shops, taco stands, construction sub-contractors, and handymen. There
are also brothels, drug stash houses and retail drug dealers.
Chaparral has long been infamous as a drug-stash-house town. White ranchers, truck
drivers, organized criminals, Mexican Drug Cartels, juvenile gang members, and even corrupt law
enforcement are involved in stashing and transporting illegal drugs into-and-out-of Chaparral.
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Chaparral also has a reputation as a place to “score” drugs. High grade cocaine, direct from Mexico
is ubiquitous in Chaparral. It is regularly available in certain neighborhoods and locations,
controlled partially by the local gangs with connections to drug trafficking organizations.
Smuggling is part of border culture. Although not everyone is involved, many know somebody
who is. Many community members on both sides of the law grew up together. Therefore, it is
common for local persecutors to target strangers rather than more known “violators.” The social
distance of the stranger not only makes them suspicious outsiders but also easier to persecute and
criminalize in terms of a lack of social attachment to potential persecutors.
On the Doña Ana County side of town there is a public elementary school, a public junior
high school, a recently added public high school which opened in 2006, and a very new “Adult
Learning Center” constructed in 2010 and affiliated with the Doña Ana Branch Community
College (DABCC), all of which are funded with county, state and federal taxes. The Otero county
side of Chaparral has no schools at all. While some of the community appears planned and has
paved roads, in many areas there are only chaotic mazes of dirt roads and trails, either side of the
county line.
Chaparral is home to blue collar workers from El Paso, retired military, law enforcement
officers, and outlaw bikers. Chaparral also attracts and produces crystal methamphetamine
manufacturers, drug traffickers, cockfight rooster breeders, evangelical Christians, Catholics,
gangsters, retirees from all over, German and Korean “War Brides” of soldiers stationed at Fort
Bliss, and Mexican immigrants from the south. Many Mexican immigrants are undocumented,
while others who are documented have relatives who are not (mixed-status households). Many of
these immigrants from Mexico engage in a pattern of survival consistent with transnationalism,
although being transnational has become increasingly difficult as the mobility regime rises and the
border is blockaded. Chaparral is a unique cultural domain where transnational forms intersect and
62

occupy real space in the interzone of the borderlands / La Frontera.
Mobility Regime Forces in Chaparral
The dominant right-wing socio-politico-economic clique with racist and nativist
sentiments, that is, those who value citizenship over human rights of immigrants, failed to
incorporate Chaparral in a 2007 community-wide vote, but they are, in fact, the quasigovernmental power structure in place there and have significant influence on Sheriff’s operations
in town. This clique represents the local element in the multi-scalar forces of persecution that
Mexican Americans and undocumented immigrants/migrants are confronted with. And this clique
often criminalizes people in their attempts to dominate their cultural domains.
This clique is most receptive to models of aggression and violence set by government
policy such as Operation Blockade, war, and the so called “War on Terror” which have the effect
of legitimating violence and aggression against those perceived by them as suspicious strangers
and threats. This clique has strong ties to both Doña Ana and Otero County Sheriffs’ Departments
and has become increasingly hostile and aggressive towards the Mexican immigrant community in
Chaparral. This is the group that encouraged the Operation Stone Garden raids in 2007. With
Homeland Security funding and with the federal government’s model of war and violence as a
solution to solving problems, the Chaparral right-wing clique was primed to deal with the Mexican
immigrants in an aggressive, unsympathetic fashion.
Liz Romer, who has lived on the Otero County/east side of Chaparral and the Doña Ana
County/west side, while working for the Doña Ana County Sheriff (on the west side of town),
enthusiastically supported the Operation Stone Garden raids on the immigrant families and
defended the sheriff’s deputies in the media; she was the only full-time county sheriff’s employee
in Chaparral during Operation Stone Garden according to ‘Gang Inroads Run Deep in Rural Areas’
by Ashley Meeks - Las Cruces Sun-News.com 12/29/2008. I observed Liz Romer in her role as the
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Doña Ana County Sheriff’s Office sub-station administrator and dispatcher as well as her role as
President on the Chaparral Community Development Association (CCDA) Executive Committee.
Betty Small and her husband own sand and gravel pit operations known as ‘Chaparral Sand &
Gravel.’
Betty Small and Liz Romer are very active in the Republican Party. I observed both of
them in their roles as Republican Election Day Judges at the polls in Chaparral during the General
Election of 2004. Romer is employed in Chaparral by the Doña County Sheriff’s Department. She
works closely with Sheriffs deputies from the Otero County Sheriff’s Department as well. Romer
and deputies from both counties, as well as Border Patrol officers, gather often at the ‘El Bayo
Steakhouse’ on the Doña Ana County side of Chaparral. Once a week all law enforcement officers
– from all jurisdictions - are invited to dine at no charge at El Bayo. El Bayo is an institution in
Chaparral – famous for its rustic hunting lodge/ranch décor and cockfighting trophy room filled
with trophies won by championship fighting roosters.
Las Cruces tends to be split roughly 50-50 between Democrats and Republicans at election
time. Outside Las Cruces much of Doña Ana County, including Chaparral, is dominated by
Republicans. A number of progressive officials in Las Cruces attempt to keep the right-wing clique
in Chaparral in check by backing county funded community projects (parks, schools, roads, trash
pick-up, etc…) on the Doña Ana County side in Chaparral. And the BNHR is a watchdog for acts
of aggression and abuse against vulnerable immigrant residents by this clique. Alamogordo and
Otero County are solidly Republican and offer no resistance to the right-wing powers in Chaparral,
and regularly provide little but a couple sheriff’s deputies. Under Operation Stone Garden the
federal government instructed the Doña Ana County and Otero County Sheriff departments to
coordinate operations.
Liz Romer, Betty Small and others of their clique have a similar belief system to those who
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support the immigration policies of Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio in Arizona. The Chaparral
right-wing clique and Otero County Sheriff attempted to adopt Arpaio’s fear factor strategy against
Mexican immigrants. Chaparral is a right-wing Republican stronghold and lost cause for
Democrats at election time. Chaparral Republicans engage in aggressive voter intimidation and
suppression tactics at election time on both sides of the county line. During the 2004 General
Election I observed them use several voter intimidation and suppression tactics against Hispanics
and Democrats; attempt to trick some voters into not officially voting; or trick some voters into
using paper, provisional ballots when the voters were registered and on the official voter roll and
should be allowed to cast their ballots on the voting machines. Provisional ballots are not counted
initially and eventually discarded unless the voter follows-up with a visit to the County Courthouse
in Las Cruces within a week after Election Day in New Mexico. During the 2012 General Election
local media reported extremely long lines and long waits to vote in Chaparral.
The right-wing Republican clique in Chaparral is regularly very hostile to Democratic Party
representatives and does not hesitate to use law enforcement and the district attorneys as weapons
against political enemies whenever possible. Susana Martinez, now the governor of New Mexico,
was the Doña Ana County District Attorney when I lived in Chaparral from 2003-2005. She was
firmly aligned with the right-wing clique in Chaparral. During the 2003-2004 election cycles she
accused the Doña Ana County Democratic Party Chairman of “stealing electricity” and went so far
as to have him arrested. Martinez accused him of essentially having an unauthorized connection for
electric service at a small ranch house in the Mesilla Valley near Las Cruces, New Mexico. The
Democratic Party chairman was unable to participate in any of the election cycle since the pending
court trial was hanging over his head. The day after the election, in which Susana Martinez was reelected as District Attorney and George W. Bush as President, Martinez quickly dropped all
charges against the Democratic Party County Chairman.
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Clearly, the Doña Ana County Democratic Party and their chairman were dragged through
the dirt to further Martinez’s political goals of getting re-elected. There was no real case against
him. Martinez charged a string of Democratic Party politicians and representatives with a variety
of crimes from theft to sexual harassment to rape. She also made a name for herself prosecuting
small-time drug offenders for possession. When Martinez campaigned in Chaparral she embraced
the nativists and spoke as someone tough on crime and “illegal” immigration. The right-wingers in
Chaparral loved her. In her successful 2010 campaign for Governor of New Mexico, Martinez ran
T.V. commercials that touted her as having fought the Mexican drug cartels as Doña Ana County
District Attorney. In point of fact there was not a single case in which she or her assistant district
attorneys prosecuted a major Mexican cartel operative.
Members of the dominant right-wing clique, such as Liz Romer, a Chaparral resident for
over 35 years and one of the leaders of the clique, are considered authorities on Chaparral as far as
many in county; state; and federal government are concerned, and she has surprising influence on
policing decisions in Chaparral. Nativist locals such as Liz Romer, Betty Small and dozens of
others in their political clique represent local elements in the multi-scalar forces of persecution of
the mobility regime. Romer is an authority figure in the Chaparral community, and a leading
component of persecution and the mobility regime. She has the ability to affect global riskmanagement strategies on the ground.
In the 1980s there were roughly 800 people living in Chaparral, predominantly WhiteEuro-Americans. Today, there are over 20,000 people in Chaparral, and probably 80 percent are
Hispanic or Mexican immigrants. This is, of course, a great concern to members of the right-wing
political clique, who find Chaparral harder to keep under their collective thumb. Therefore, Liz
Romer, had a hand in coordinating both County Sheriff’s Department roles and in calling in the
ICE agents assigned to Chaparral for Operation Stone Garden.
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Liz Romer is a large and intimidating looking woman. I found her to be very
argumentative, cynical and having a dark view of her fellow human beings and world. She has
lived in Chaparral for over 35 years - was fired or resigned from a job at the middle school years
before I arrived for some controversy I am unclear about. I recently heard from a resident of
Chaparral that she has been replaced as the dispatcher and office administrator for the Doña Ana
County Sheriff’s sub-station in Chaparral (as stated earlier - she was the only full-time sheriff
employee in Chaparral at the time of the Stone Garden raids in 2007).
Liz Romer was also the president of the Chaparral Community Development Association
(CCDA). She and "Betty Small (also on the CCDA executive committee) are best friends and both
were Republican Election Day judges at the polls in 2004 when I was a Democratic Party
"Challenger" at the same three precincts on the Doña Ana County side (in the Jr. High gym) - I
caught Betty Small essentially trying to throw away registered Democrat votes - she also went over
the line in questioning voters.
Romer and Small were always trying to identify undocumented people - they were very
open about voicing their concerns that they believed lots of undocumented immigrants were voting
in elections. They also were obsessed with trying to identify who was a Catholic, or perhaps
Evangelical like them. Betty also was the publisher of an outrageous “newspaper" called "The
Beacon" - which often expressed dislike for liberals, immigrants, Democrats and Catholics. It was
a free paper left at convenience stores and gas stations. I have not seen it around for years.
One day in the fall of 2003, I encountered Liz Romer at the city park (built and funded by
the county after Democratic efforts). She was sitting on a big motorcycle in a sleeveless shirt that
allowed me to see her gigantic eagle tattoos and American flags on each upper arm. Trying not to
show my shock regarding her tattoos I greeted her friendly and tried to strike up a conversation
about an idea I had. I thought that maybe the CCDA would possibly consider promoting some
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programs and activities for the young people in the community who were either already members
of gangs or potential recruits. I thought that if there were more options and opportunities to get
involved in sports clubs and teams, art, books, etc… these vulnerable kids would be less likely to
stay involved in gang activity which included frequent clashes and fights with perceived “enemies”
from other groups or gangs.
Liz Romer told me that sort of stuff was not what the CCDA was about. She explained very
harshly that the focus of the CCDA was business and the promotion of businesses in Chaparral
with as little regulation as possible. Then she went on to tell me in a threatening tone that the
young gang kids and immigrants I had befriended and was helping were "dirt" and I was” going to
get dirty” if I tried to help them. I attempted to be positive and told her that the new high school
that Doña Ana County was planning to build and fund in Chaparral was a step in the right direction
for Chaparral youth.
At that time the Chaparral kids on the Doña Ana County side traveled 20 miles to Gadsden
High near Anthony, New Mexico. The Otero side’s closet school, of any kind, was 70 miles away
in Alamogordo. Romer told me to forget about it because the kids in gangs and the undocumented
immigrant children would never be allowed to set foot in the new school. And she said, “The gang
boys are all going to prison and the “illegals” will be deported.” I just walked away.
Liz Romer, Betty Small and Jim Layer (a New Mexico State Highway Patrol Officer who
lives in Chaparral) were members of the clique which planned the unsuccessful attempted
incorporation of Chaparral under their control. In media interviews/reports from the period Liz
Romer defended the Otero sheriff and deputies after the Operation Stone Garden immigration raids
began and complaints were filed by the immigrants and BNHR. She was one of very few to defend
the raids in interviews in 2007 and 2008, saying: "Stonegarden is designed to address real
problems that Chaparral has," said Liz Romer (a pseudonym), president of the Chaparral
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Community Development Association and the office manager for the Doña Ana County Sheriff's
Department substation in Chaparral. "Human smuggling has become almost a cottage industry."
(Romo 2007.)
I learned fully well after dealing with Romer for two years (2003-2005), this is typical
Romer fashion, to conflate and malign people as something they are not, to justify their
persecution. I believe she lives for it. Not one of the people detained by Otero County Sheriff’s
deputies and, or deported was linked to human smuggling organizations, terrorism, violence or
crime. In fact, they were all settled families, working, going to school, trying to cope and survive.
Asked if the presence of illegal immigrants in Chaparral is a problem, Romer said: "On a day-today basis, it's not. But along with the good, decent people come the bad people, and the bad people
deal in drugs and human smuggling and gangs, and those are issues" (Romo 2007). So then, why
does she also defend the persecution of the settled immigrant families with no connections to drug
smuggling, human smuggling or crime? She never focused her persecution on the major cartels and
outlaw White supremacist bikers whom she mingled with in Chaparral for decades at the
cockfights, at El Bayo and elsewhere on the Otero County side and the Doña Ana County Sheriff
side.
A year later, Romer was on the attack again in the media, this time by criminalizing the
youngsters of Chaparral who she had helped neglect for decades with her outspoken support of
cuts in educational and social services. She was a big-time anti-New Dealer – ready to cut benefits
to the needy, crush the vulnerable and anyone that got in her way: “We have 25 square miles, two
different counties, two deputies out here [not with all the Stone Garden Funding] ... It's a very fluid
community. The gangs don't know state lines," Romer said. "It's in your face. Their tagging, the
drugs, the colors — they walk down the street, it's pretty obvious." In 1978, the population was
around 800, said Romer, a former middle school teacher. Now, 30 years later, the 20,000-resident
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Chaparral "is not the sleepy little town it used to be. The cities have clamped down, but now it's
pushed into the rural areas,"” Romer” said. "It's not coming from outside, it's here” (Meeks 2008).
Romer was skilled in presenting herself as an ethical and concerned person of the
community but I learned very well that she was not. She reaped what she had sowed for over thirty
years as a bigoted and racist tyrant who used her authority to crush vulnerable others without the
slightest empathy or sympathy. She has one of the darkest and most vicious views of humanity I
have ever met. Unless someone (including children) was of her Ultra-Right-Wing-WhiteEvangelical ilk - she so often presented to me and others as morally “superior” – you were “dirty”
and “criminal” “threats” to “her” Chaparral. It can never go back to what she dreams: that of 800
people (predominantly White-Euro-Americans) as it was in the 1980s. That she ever was allowed
to teach children at the middle school in Chaparral should be frightening to any parent. More so if
they knew of her tattoos that she usually kept concealed on her upper arms.
The “War on Terror,” legitimation of violence and Operation Stone Garden served as a
cover for the dominant right-wing White minority/majority in Chaparral that felt threatened by the
now larger and fast-growing Hispanic population. With federal funding from Operation Stone
Garden there was plenty of money to pay deputies in Otero and Doña Ana counties to go after the
immigrants in Chaparral. The stated goal was to intercept WMDs at the border, catch terrorists,
drug smugglers, human smugglers and violent criminals. Instead, on the Otero County side of
Chaparral, in the summer of 2007, they used Operation Stone Garden funding to pay dozens of
sheriff’s deputies to round-up dozens of settled families and individuals for no other reason than
their immigration status. All the players knew their roles. The local elements had tasked-forced
before and, with new fangs courtesy of Operation Stone Garden; they orchestrated an operation to
remove immigrant strangers in the now superheated climate of fear, suspicion and hatred of
strangers.
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Cockfighting , Cocaine Cowboys and Cartels in Chaparral
The cockfight arena in Chaparral was a transplant of Mexican ranch culture and machismo,
but had its roots in White culture too. White ranchers, truck drivers, outlaws, and others from rural
communities with cockfight traditions attended the cockfights in Chaparral.

The Federal

Government finally raided the cockfights in 2010, after pressure from People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals (PETA) and Governor Richardson led the state legislature to outlaw
cockfighting in New Mexico. Often there were over 300 people at the cockfights, but when the raid
came participants had been tipped-off and only 12 people were at the arena on County Line Road
when the feds arrived. West Side Locos (WSL) pee-wees told me they knew sheriff’s deputies
who collaborated with particular drug traffickers in Chaparral; no doubt they looked out for the
“cockfighters” too.
In what should have been a focus of the Sheriffs in Chaparral in 2007 during Operation
Stone Garden, rather than hunting immigrant families, was later uncovered by the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency. The DEA uncovered the cartel activities associated with the cockfights on
the Otero County side of Chaparral. The Chaparral cockfights were notorious; White-EuroAmericans, Mexican-Americans and Mexicans all participated. Many Chaparralitos (my term)
seemed proud of the town’s blood sport tradition. The right-wing clique that controls the political
dimensions and heavily influences policing in Chaparral didn’t have any complaints in regards to
the cockfights. When Governor Bill Richardson made closing down the cockfights in Chaparral a
priority, some of the Republican “ranchers” in Chaparral complained that Richardson and his “big
government” regulations were attacking their freedom.
The cockfight culture included Mexican drug cartel players, such as members of the
Sinaloa Cartel, led by Chapo Guzman and the Juárez /“La Linea” Cartel, headed by the CarrilloFuentes family. According to testimony by DEA agents and others during the 2010 federal
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criminal court trial (which I attended and took notes)in El Paso of a Sinaloa cartel chieftain, named
Arambula, the cockfights in Chaparral served as a central meeting place for members of the cartels
to contract with buyers of marijuana stashed in Chaparral at ranch properties and elsewhere. The
marijuana was later trucked to distant destinations, including Kansas City and Chicago.
Trial testimony revealed that members of different cartel organizations were often present
at these cockfights so buyers could deal with multiple cartels. The cockfights provided a time and
place for a transnational commodity exchange in illegal drugs. Buyers inspected marijuana stashed
at ranches in Chaparral and made sure the marijuana was of high grade and quality. At the 2010
Arambula trial testimony revealed that a White “rancher” in Chaparral attended the cockfights
where he met major traffickers of illegal drugs from the Juárez and Sinaloa cartels, as well as with
other smugglers. This rancher became a significant operative of the drug traffickers. During the
period 2006-2009 he stored thousands of pounds of marijuana at his ranch property in Chaparral.
He and his associates would cleanup and repackage the drugs before the associates would take
them in semi-trucks to different destinations throughout the U.S.
Steve, a former drug smuggler from El Paso, whose crew included his three brothers and
others from their barrio near the river in El Paso told me that starting in the 1970s, when it was
relatively easy to smuggle sacks of drugs across the river, that his crew had crossed several
hundred pounds of illegal drugs, including marijuana, heroin, and cocaine from Juárez into El Paso
and then to Chaparral. Campbell (2009) interviewed other members of this drug smuggling crew
and they described the details of their methods of crossing illegal drugs into El Paso. Steve told me
that he and his brothers had a truck outfitted with rooster cages and that they participated in the
cockfights in Chaparral where they also stashed hundreds of pounds of drugs, sometimes burying
the drugs in the desert until they were ready to move them elsewhere. Steve told me one of his
brothers was murdered by three “junkies” and robbed of two million dollars in drugs in Chaparral
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in 2002. In 2010 another brother was killed at a home in Juárez by assassins wielding AK-47s.
Steve also told me that “De Otero Side” (DOS) gang members acted as sicarios (assassins) for one
or another of the cartels. Testimony during the Arambula trial revealed that the Sinaloa cartel had
teams of street soldiers at several strategic locations in the El Paso southwest, including in
Chaparral.
Chaparral is considered by federal law enforcement to be part of the ‘Bandidos’ Outlaw
Motorcycle Gang (OMG) empire which is reported to have close to 3,000 members nationally and
internationally, many of whom espouse a White Supremacist philosophy. The Bandidos
historically were most dominant around San Antonio, Texas and throughout Texas, Louisiana, and
New Mexico, but are currently headquartered in the state of Washington (according to Gangland –
History Channel.) They have members and chapters throughout the U.S. as well as internationally,
including Europe and Mexico. I see and talk to Bandidos often around El Paso. The Bandidos
traffic in illegal contraband, including, drugs: crystal methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin and
marijuana; guns; stolen property, as well as having a hand in prostitution and murder-for-hire.
Their membership is made up of non-Hispanic White and White Hispanic males. Many Bandidos
are also former U.S. military soldiers who emphasize living lives of extreme loyalty to their
brothers in arms and ride powerful motorcycles. The Bandidos have a long history and a vicious
reputation.
An El Paso Times newspaper story dated October 31, 2002, details the case of two teenage
gang members from Chaparral, who robbed a convenience store in El Paso and shot and killed the
night clerk. The newspaper report stated that the gang was known as the “West Side Locos”
(WSL). The two gang members were arrested in Chaparral after a tip was called in to the police.
The gunmen were eventually convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison. Neither of
the boys involved in this horrendous crime were immigrants. The West Side Locos of Chaparral
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are part of a wider West Side Loco gang with affiliates in New Mexico, Arizona and California. In
El Paso, the “Barrio Azteca” gang consolidated street gang and smuggling activity by bringing
many of El Paso’s smaller street gangs under its umbrella. With Chaparral’s proximity to the El
Paso smuggling corridor from Juárez, the West Side Locos and others in Chaparral contributed
their assistance to the Barrio Aztecas and other smuggling organizations which use the town to
stash and sell their illegal drugs.
Chaparral “Bad Boys” with “Enemies”
In 2003-2005 the two most well-known local gangs of boys in Chaparral were the ‘WestSide Locos’ (WSL), who dominated the Doña Ana County side of town, and’ DOS’ / ‘De Otero
Side’, who dominated the Otero County side of Chaparral. I first met West Side Locos “Pee-Wee”
members (young members 12-18 years old) in the summer of 2003 when five of them came to my
home and introduced themselves to me.
It was a little leery at first. I hadn’t expected them and they were all dressed in their
traditional garb (white T-shirts, black ball-caps, black or white bandanas, black or white pants or
shorts, sports sneakers) – but they were tough little boys and had a cool-moxie; ability to face
difficulty with spirit and courage.

I did not dislike them from the beginning, and we were all

friendly enough to each other, but I wasn’t sure where this meeting might lead. I would get to
know these boys and other of their “secret society associates” (WSL members) better over the next
two years. In short, I came to understand that these were not “bad boys”; they just did “bad things.”
While standing in the doorway of my trailer home and them outside, in the first couple of minutes I
first met the pee-wees, one of them said to me “we’re a “connection-gang” and can get you
anything you want.”
A week after I first met the five “pee-wees” they and three other members broke into my
trailer home while I was away in Las Cruces working at Democratic Party headquarters. When I
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came home late in the evening, the eight of them were still there. The boys were sitting in my
“living room” amongst all my piles of books; “doo-dads”; “thing-a-ma-jigs” and “what-nots,” that
I had been collecting at garage and estate sales in El Paso over the years – some stuff I sold on
EBay and some I just like having around. I was attached to many of the books. Of course I was
shocked and disturbed to find they had broken in, but I actually had to fake being mad. And I think
they could tell. I didn’t have anything in my trailer home that the boys would want or that I didn’t
mind if they did. And my dogs and cats were all fine. The boys had been waiting for me and were
all smoking big marijuana joints.
When I first had arrived home that summer night in 2013 – came to find the door open –
walked in and saw all the boys – I had immediately shouted “what the fuck are you guys doing in
my house!” One of the older boys, “Googy” said with a big grin on his face – “Shut-the-Fuck-up
Güero” (someone with light hair or fair complexion) as he offered me his joint. I shouted “GET
THE FUCK OUT” but I let out a giggle. “Googy said again – “Shut-the-Fuck-up Güero” while still
offering the joint. I shouted again “GET THE FUCK OUT” – this time able to contain myself.
Then all the boys traded eye contact with each other and all rose-up together - around me – still all
signaling each other with their eyes. I knew they were going to jump me.
I am not a giant but not small either and had had my fair share of fighting as a boy. They
were eight boys, ages 12-17 but still only pee-wees; still young pups. I didn’t want to hurt them
and fended them off for a while in a rather playful way. I think they were impressed, but eventually
they all got a hold off me somewhere and we went crashing down – me on the bottom. We had all
started laughing and nobody tried to cause me real harm, except the youngest boy, 12 year old
“Little-G.” While the other boys still held me down on the floor of my trailer home – Little-G had
started kicking me in the head – which angered the other boys at him – and they made him stop. I
was angry now too – FOR REAL! And the boys could tell. This time when I shouted for them to
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leave, they did.
I did not notice anything missing from my home after the locos left the night we “rumbled.”
I didn’t have anything they wanted. Perhaps some small trinket or pocket knife, I didn’t care. I had
lots of that kind of stuff and could always get more “junk” at the endless sales in El Paso; endless
garage sales - of endless junk that I could sell on EBay, or possess and leave lying around my
home. I did not see the locos around for two weeks. They were all staying hidden, perhaps
thinking I might have complained to the police. But I had not.
Then, a few weeks later, while working on my computer one late night – I could smell
marijuana in the air. I walked outside; it was dark, and warm with a slight breeze. My eyes
adjusted to the dark and I heard someone saying over and over in a very quiet tone –
“Güero”…”Güero”…”Güero.” I could see a cluster of the boy’s silhouettes, about 100 feet away
– at the back of my lot. I slowly walked up to the group of six or seven locos, and as I reached
them – Googy extended his hand to me - offering the joint they had been smoking. That was it. My
friendship with the locos had been solidified. After that, they never hurt me, and I never hurt them.
And while I worked to make them non-violent Democrats – they worked to make me a loco. In
some ways I succeeded - and in some ways - so did they.
A far majority of the children in Chaparral are not gang members and do not engage in
criminal activity. 99% of the children in Chaparral go to school every day, study, play sports, play
musical instruments, and try to avoid the “locos”, as WSL are often referred, or other gang
members. Gang kids like the pee-wees are the “bad boys” of the school, and “bad boys” of the
neighborhoods. Every town has these same types of young, tough boys. But with Chaparral’s
strategic proximity to the U.S.-Mexico border and the presence of drug smugglers and cartel
members often made it a little wilder than most other towns for boys who do “bad” things. The
oldest members of the WSL I eventually met were in their 40s. The WSL and their bitter rivals,
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DOS, both dealt with Barrio Aztecas from El Paso; Bandidos; and agents of different Mexican
drug cartels, including the Juárez/Carrillo Fuentes Cartel; Chapo Guzman’s Sinaloa Cartel; “La
Familia” (who now call themselves “The Knights Templar”) from Michoacán; and the “Zetas.”
The WSL pee-wees saw me as living on their turf since I lived on the Doña Ana County
side of Chaparral. In Chaparral, 2003-2005, there were approximately 40 juvenile “pee-wee” WSL
members and roughly another 40 older members. The boys told me that east Chaparral, the “Otero
Side,” was controlled by their rivals and bitter enemies, “DOS,” “De Otero Side.” The WSL and
DOS fought over street turf and drug trafficking connections in Chaparral for decades. Barrio
Azteca and Bandidos members have recently told me that the Barrio Aztecas had succeeded in
bringing the gangs of Chaparral under their control, and forged a peace alliance between the rival
gangs. The WSL and DOS members are mostly Hispanic U.S. citizens but have several EuroAmerican and mixed-ethnic members as well, and they endlessly attempt to recruit (through
intimidation) young immigrant boys into their organizations. The gangs of Chaparral find the
immigrants easy victims to rob because the immigrants are afraid to complain to authorities.
Immigrant families in Chaparral fear the Locos and DOS but are more afraid of Liz Romer, the
sheriff’s deputies, Border Patrol, and ICE agents. The immigrant families cannot go to the
authorities for help because they fear family members may become detained and deported.
In a futile effort to compensate for the lack of regular community policing in Chaparral, the
county sheriff’s departments of Doña Ana and Otero counties occasionally engage in task-force
operations. Perhaps the task-force operations are the result of an investigation or tip, but from
what I observed the bi-county-sheriff task forces seem most often to be random shows of
overwhelming numbers in forlorn hope of somehow bringing order to a community which
normally runs wild. The sheriffs don’t seem to have a plan other than to once in a while cast out a
big dragnet in hopes of catching some criminals. There are a couple sheriffs’ deputies and one state
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police officer who lives in Chaparral, but law enforcement is generally not familiar with the people
of Chaparral. The sheriffs don’t seem to know either the community or how organized crime
operates in Chaparral; perhaps this is why Chaparral has been refuge for criminals and a base for
their activities for decades.

Operation Stone Garden in Chaparral – Summer 2007
Freddie Vasquez’s (a U.S. citizen) affidavit was included in the complaint filed by
plaintiffs’/immigrants’ attorneys on May 5, 2008 in federal court against the Otero County Sheriff
and his deputies. Hernandez states that when he and his girlfriend were detained by an Otero
Sheriff Deputy for being suspected undocumented immigrants, and then handed over to two Border
Patrol agents, the Border Patrol agents took Freddie and his girlfriend to the Doña Ana County
Sheriff sub-station in Chaparral for questioning.
The case of Freddie and his girlfriend are just a single example of several dozen Hispanic
or Latino households swept up by sheriff’s deputies during Operation Stone Garden during the
summer months of 2007 in which undocumented immigrants, as well as Mexican Americans and
legal residents were detained by Otero County Sheriff’s Deputies; the undocumented were turned
over to Border Patrol officers/ Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), leading to
deportation to Mexico. Hispanic or Latino households that were not physically invaded during
Stone Garden were terrorized by the operation and the threat of being caught up in the dragnet.
Not one of the Mexican Americans or undocumented immigrants detained by the Otero
County Sheriff’s deputies was a terrorist (there are no terrorists in Chaparral and never have been)
or even had a criminal background (federal lawsuit transcript; also Meeks 2008, and Romo 2007,
etc…). 28 (confirmed) undocumented immigrants among those detained by the deputies were
eventually deported as a result of Operation Stone Garden in the summer of 2007 in Chaparral. The
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complaint filed in federal court by the plaintiffs’ attorneys describes how Operation Stone Garden
was applied by the Otero Sheriff’s Department to the immigrant community as it escalated into a
Sheriff Joe Arpaio-type immigration sweep, applying the fear factor to extremes:
“Throughout the summer months of 2007 Defendants engaged in a series of
increasingly aggressive campaigns aimed at identifying and apprehending
undocumented immigrants in Chaparral, New Mexico which culminated on
September 10, 2007, in a community-wide series of raids targeting low-income
Latino residents, including Plaintiffs. Defendants’ activities were motivated by
the receipt of a lucrative federal grant under the auspices of Operation
Stone Garden. . . [Defendants’] operations primarily entailed going home to home
In the tight-knit clusters of low-income family homes that dot the desert in
Chaparral, interrogating the Latino residents about their immigration status and
even invading homes without warrants or any evidence of criminal activity. In
these raids, Defendants harassed, interrogated, and searched homes belonging to
citizens and legal residents in addition to undocumented residents”
(Plaintiffs’ Complaint: Case 6:07-cv-01045-MV-WPL Document 60 Filed 09/19/2008: p. 2)

Although perhaps coincidental, it is interesting to note that the raids peaked on September
10th, 2007 – the day before the anniversary of the symbolically charged day of infamous terror:
9/11. There were no radical Muslim extremist terrorists to be found in Chaparral, although bogus
rumors were reported in local newspapers, of Al Qaeda terrorists smuggled into Chaparral. Even
local television stations in El Paso and Las Cruces ran stories based on the rumors. Theses
fantasies were never substantiated in any way. The mobility regime was hungry for suspicious
strangers, so Mexican immigrants became scapegoats. Racists, nativists and opportunists in
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Chaparral wanted the immigrants out, and the immigrants were attacked.
Members of the quasi-governmental, minority-majority, right-wing clique that dominates
in Chaparral say they don’t want big government, and that they only want to live in freedom, but
when they see “strange people” in their community living freely, it frightens them, and they
become dangerous to the strangers, especially in a time of legitimated violence.
Dunn (2009) reported that post 9/11; Border Patrol officials said in 2004 that antiterrorism
is now the highest priority of the unit” (p. 168). But Dunn (2009) also notes the findings of
investigative journalists that “physical abuse [of undocumented immigrants] is deep-rooted in the
Border Patrol culture, according to some veteran agents” (p. 203). As the mannequin story (on
pages 34-36) suggests and Operation Stone Garden strongly shows, abuse of undocumented
immigrants is deep-rooted in the sheriff’s departments of southern New Mexico as well. Not one of
the immigrants detained during Operation Stone Garden was a terrorist or even had a criminal
background. All were members of families; some of documented households, some of
undocumented households, some of mixed-status households, attempting to settle in Chaparral, and
they all were attacked in the summer of 2007 by the Otero County Sheriff’s Deputies under the
guise of Homeland Security’s antiterrorism initiative, Operation Stone Garden.
Family homes were invaded without search warrants or probable cause – deputies often
used bogus concerns and trumped-up excuses such as the burning of brush (legal in Chaparral) –
or, “eyesores” such as an old refrigerator on a front porch. Deputies even poised as pizza delivery
boys to gain access into family homes. Doors were kicked in; parents dragged away from their
children in violent, abusive, humiliating fashion and handed over to Border Patrol and Immigration
and Customs agents. Instead of focusing on antiterrorism, weapons of mass destruction, smuggling
organizations and violent criminals as Operation Stone Garden was intended; the Sheriffs and
Border Patrol attacked the fabric of society in Chaparral.
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Chaparral, New Mexico and the “War on Terror”
In September of 2006 (Sept. 6, revised Sept. 11) the Department of Homeland Security
issued the Operation Stone Garden Supplemental: Program Guidance and Application Kit. “Public
Law #109-234 provided a one-time appropriation of $15 million in grant funding for use at the
discretion of the Secretary to supplement the ongoing efforts of Operation Stone Garden within the
four Southwest Border States (Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California). The Operation Stone
Garden allocations were: Arizona: $6,353,174; California: $1,000,000; New Mexico: $1,580,258;
and Texas: $3,070,008.
On December 20, 2006, John Blansett, the Otero County Sheriff, sent a letter to Tim
Manning, Director of Homeland Security for the State of New Mexico. In the letter, Sheriff
Blansett requested funding under Operation Stone Garden to help finance his department’s efforts
to interdict undocumented immigrant smuggling, Mexican cartel drug smuggling operations,
terrorism, and the search for weapons of mass destruction which he indicates are connected to the
routes of undocumented immigrant smuggling and the immigrants themselves. “Since 2004
antiterrorism was the main focus of the Border Patrol” (Dunn 2009), and in 2007 antiterrorism was
the focus of Homeland Security and its Operation Stone Garden. The sheriff does not mention
settled immigrants as a target of either his regular or special Homeland Security functions. Nor
does the DHS although they did emphasize:
“The potential to smuggle terrorists and weapons of mass destruction away from the
immediate border area and to major population centers in the U.S. remain high throughout the
State of New Mexico. Agencies working in close proximity to the border, specifically the Grant
County Sheriff’s Office, Hidalgo County Sheriff’s Office, Lordsburg Police Department, Luna
County Sheriff’s Office, Doña Ana County Sheriff’s Office, Sunland Park Police Department, and
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the Otero County Sheriff’s Office and the New Mexico Department of Public Safety/Law
Enforcement Program may also come in contact with individuals involved with organized criminal
smuggling organizations.”
The 3/21/2007 DHS/BCBP Op Order report describes roles in Operation Stone Garden, of
each participating southern New Mexico County Sheriff’s Office, other local law enforcement, and
the New Mexico Department of Public Safety. The report describes the Otero County Sheriff’s
Office role in Operation Stone Garden:
“Coordination of officers assigned to this detail and assets will be accomplished between
the Otero Co. Sheriff’s Office chain of command and the U.S. Border Patrol, Alamogordo
Station’s chain of command. During the times of the operation, Otero Co. Sheriff officers will
maintain vigilance in the area known as the east mesa. They will patrol on state roads 506 and 24
and on U.S. 82 between the communities of Dunken and Hope, New Mexico. Their intent is to
employ methods to assist in deterring illicit cross-border traffic in areas predetermined and
identified by the Alamogordo Border Patrol Station which provide egress from the Mexican border
and provide staging areas for human and narcotics smuggling furtherance into the United States.
Otero County Sheriff’s Office will provide assistance to the area of Chaparral, NM.”
And the report describes the Doña Ana County Sheriff’s role in Operation Stone Garden:
“Doña Ana County encompasses the areas of responsibility of two different Border Patrol Stations
– Las Cruces and Santa Teresa. Therefore, DACSO will have to coordinate with the station
responsible for the AOR where they will be conducting operations. DACSO will provide
assistance to towns being used to stage/support smuggling operations, specifically Chaparral and
Hatch, NM. Officers working in the Sunland Park area will coordinate operations with the Santa
Teresa PAIC. Officers working in the Hatch area will coordinate operations with the Las Cruces
PAIC.”
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Adjacent to Chaparral, on the Otero county side, is a county prison which is federally
funded but privatized. The prison is divided between criminal offenders on one side of the facility
and people brought in by ICE agents for Immigration violations on the other. The official addresses
for this prison is 10 McGregor Range Road, Chaparral and 29 McGregor Range Road, Chaparral,
New Mexico. One address is for immigration offenses and another for criminal offenses, but in
reality it is one prison.
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Illustration 4.1: Immigrants were able to resist Operation Stone Garden Persecution after the Border
Network for Human Rights (BNHR) and Attorneys at the Paso del Norte Civil Rights
Project stepped in to confront the Otero Sheriff in the media, community and federal
courts.
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Illustration 4.2:

Regional gathering of the BNHR in El Paso, Texas c. 2012.
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Illustration 4.3:

BNHR Regional committee meeting in El Paso c.2013.
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Illustration 4.4:

BNHR community demonstration in El Paso, Texas c.2013.
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Illustration 4.5: El Paso Politicos at BNHR event in El Paso c.2013, including: Newly elected U.S.
Congressman, Beto O’Rourke (second from right); Texas State Representative, Jose
Rodriguez (center); El Paso County Judge Veronica Escobar (Center-right); El Paso City
Council Reps. Eddie Holguin (second from left), Susie Byrd (third from left). Also
pictured are staffers for newly elected U.S. Congressman, Pete P. Gallegos
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Illustration 4.6: Community members of the BNHR engaging in dialogue with the Border Patrol c.2013.
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Illustration 4.7: BNHR Director, Fernando Garcia and staff members with community organizers holding
BNHR training completion certificates c.2013.
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Illustration 4.8: American Patriots at BNHR rally c. 2013.
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Illustration 4.9: Border Fence Peace Demonstration between Sunland Park, NM & Anapara, Chihuahua, 2011.
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Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusion
Madness, Persecution and Resistance
The cant is often repeated in the United States that everything changed after
September 11th, 2001. The so-called “War on Terror” was announced by the highest level
of governmental authority. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, waging full-scale war,
killing thousands of “combatants” and civilians, including women, children, and the
elderly. As fear and of terrorism - turned to hatred spread across the U.S. - and the
government provided a model through the killing in war and “War on Terrorism”, violence
became legitimated as a solution to perceived threats. Globalization had already given rise
to the mobility regime that is intended to obstruct and contain global flows of
disadvantaged workers for the sake of nativists, “national security” and the “economic
security” of dominant groups. The mobility regime was fertilized by the wars and
legitimation of violence while immigration flows became conflated with threats of
terrorism - misconstrued as suspicious and dangerous strangers.
In Chaparral, New Mexico a large settled immigrant population who had been
allowed to rise for decades was attacked by elements of the mobility regime since violence
and aggression were now perceived as acceptable solutions for dealing with suspicious
strangers. Community insiders with social power and capital connected to political and
official government offices, including law enforcement at local, state and federal levels
constitute elements of the mobility regime and multi-scalar forces of persecution that
consolidated community power and control over the immigrant population by effecting
national security and immigration policy at the local level. Homeland Security pushed the
mobility regime to go after terrorists, smugglers and violent criminal organizations. In the
climate of legitimation of violence – and - with the lure of lucrative Homeland Security
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funding the dominant nativist clique in Chaparral pushed the Otero Sheriff to go after
undocumented immigrants. The Sheriff’s practices snowballed into large neighborhoodwide immigration dragnet. In the period of legitimated violence, when life has little value,
profit is found in violence against the stranger.
There is no logical reason that the Mexican immigrant population of Chaparral
should be oppressed and treated as suspicious and dangerous strangers. Ethington (1997)
reminds us in Simmel’s (1908) intellectual construction of “Social Distance” and “Social
Geometry” that “a social type does not derive from an inner attitude on the part of the
stranger, one of “not fitting in” due to personality differences with the group” (p. 3).
Simmel (1908) understood that “type” is a social construction. In short, the Mexican
immigrants in Chaparral were unfairly constructed into a negative, suspicious, dangerous
type, causing harm to the immigrant settlement. Not only is it ethically and morally wrong
to give tacit support for such typing and treatment but it is counter-productive to the true
safety and security of the community and country.
Rather than attacking, disrupting and criminalizing immigrant communities out of
fear and suspicion, the real path to a safe, secure society is to allow the immigrants to settle
in peace and maintain their family, friendship and business ties within the local community
and across borders transnationally. We desperately need to allow Mexico and the United
States to peacefully integrate (as NAFTA suggests) without halting or criminalizing
immigrant flows. Criminalizing migrant workers only aggravates and slows the integration
process while degrading the human condition for the poor as well as the wealthy.
When violence is legitimated and practiced on a population, all our lives lose value,
and we all become more vulnerable to become a victim of violence. Our nation must move
beyond war and realize that peaceful solutions are the only viable options if our species is
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to survive and live under conditions worth living. No doubt the United States is deeply
engaged in a cycle of Legitimation of Violence (LOV). But organizations and networks of
human rights activists have risen to take up the challenge of moving beyond war and
realizing universal human rights. Using the Border Network for Human Rights model, our
society can realize universal human rights. And if we can put an end to war we can
accomplish Legitimation of Violence Ending (LOVE).
If not for the activities of the Border Network For Human Rights (BNHR) and
other NGOs and individuals in the human rights regime/multi-scalar forces of resistance,
who rose to defend the immigrants and help the immigrants file complaints with their
attorneys at the Paso del Norte Civil Rights Project, it would have no doubt continued, and
likely spread to the Doña Ana side. The federal judge assigned the case ordered the Otero
sheriff to stop the immigration raids until a trial could be held. In the meantime, the Sheriff
decided in 2008 to settle, agreeing not to execute further immigration sweeps in Chaparral,
not to violate the civil rights of Hispanics or Mexican immigrants (at least not so blatantly),
and not to conduct illegal searches of immigrant communities and homes in the future (at
least not so blatantly).
The Sheriff essentially agreed to leave the settled immigrants alone in Chaparral
(deputies hunt immigrants still – just not so blatantly as they did during the summer of
2007). The Otero Sheriff’s Department also agreed to pay an undisclosed monetary
settlement to the immigrants who were plaintiffs in the lawsuit. Still, the Mexican
immigrant family community was severely damaged by the Otero Sheriff’s misapplication
of Operation Stone Garden in Chaparral; devastated economically, structurally, and
psychologically. Operation Stone Garden is still active in the U.S. Border States. And the
fear factor is high in Chaparral, and immigrants still continue to hide.
95

In light of the BNHR entrance and development as a formable force for immigrant
rights advocacy in the El Paso southwest, it is surprising that the settled immigrant families
were attacked by the Otero Sheriff’s deputies in the summer of 2007; and that Border Patrol
officers assisted the deputies by taking custody of the immigrants the deputies had
apprehended. Even more so when considering that in 2006, the ‘Texas Civil Rights Project’
opened a fully staffed office of civil rights and human rights litigators in El Paso called the
‘Paso del Norte Civil Rights Project (PNCR).’ The PNCR became close partners to the
BNHR from the opening of their office in 2006. When the BNHR was alerted to the 2007
Otero Sheriff’s raids on the immigrants in Chaparral – it was the PNCR that put a stop to
the abuse in federal courts – persuading the Sheriff to back off the immigrants, promise to
never engage in that level of immigration enforcement again and pay an undisclosed
settlement to the families they abused.
As I was ignorant of the BNHR and PNCR in 2007, it seems so too was the Otero
County Sheriff, 70 miles away in Alamogordo - across the Tularosa Basin - from
Chaparral. The El Paso BP sector chiefs were well aware of the BNHR and PNCR. Surely
someone at the BP must have warned the Otero Sheriff they were crossing the line into civil
and human rights abuse and there would be a strong response from the multi-scalar forces
of resistance that had already risen to protect the immigrants in the El Paso southwest. It is
a puzzle but not as complex as it seems in the framework of my theory.
I argue that, the Otero Sheriff, his deputies, and local persecutors in Chaparral were
greatly influenced by the so-called “War on Terror,” associated legitimation of violence,
and the lure of lucrative federal funding (for antiterrorism). I can only imagine the bravado
of the Otero Sheriff, his deputies and, the right-wing clique in Chaparral that encouraged
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them to attack the immigrants – immersed in a national climate that poured down
legitimation of violence upon them. These persecutors were blinded with fear - turned to
hatred – turned to aggression and violence the federal government had modeled for them in
war and the so-called “War on Terror”, and so-called “War on Drugs” – as well as blinded
with greed. Blinded by the factors I just listed – within their social domain of persecution they did not see and, or underestimated the immigrants, BNHR, PNCR and other human
rights elements spearheading out of El Paso.
A new tone had been set by the human rights regime but the Otero Sheriff had not
listened. David Urias, a San Antonio, Texas-based attorney for the Mexican American
Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), said “(Otero County) deputies appear to
have crossed a line that local law enforcement agencies nationwide have traditionally
stopped short of: going after immigrants who are living in the U.S. without authorization, a
civil violation” (Romo 2007). Urias simply explains the difference in what local police are
authorized to do and what the Otero deputies had done in regard to immigration: "You're
talking about two different types of situations where, for instance, a state officer comes
across information in the course of his normal duties, - that's different from actually going
out and searching for somebody. That's what we have in Otero County" (Romo 2007).
The Otero Sheriff and deputies began to spin: Sanchez, the undersheriff, has said,
"We are not going down there targeting or profiling these people," Sanchez said. "We do
the same operations in (other) parts of the county" (Romo 2007). However, in a July 9 email to officials from other border sheriff's departments, Ledbetter, the Otero County
sheriff's lieutenant, wrote: "Our patrols in the community of Chaparral have been very
productive ... The majority of our activity at this time seems to center around subjects
illegally residing in and around Chaparral” (Romo 2007). In July 2007, Ledbetter noted in
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the memo on the status of Stone Garden, “the sheriff's department had handed the Border
Patrol 33 people who were subsequently deported - the majority of this activity has been
located in Chaparral," (Romo 2007).
Surely, the BP officers that the sheriff’s deputies pulled in to Chaparral were
hesitant accomplices. The Border Patrol and Homeland Security officials quickly distanced
their agencies from the Otero Sheriff when the BNHR and PNCR sprang into action.
Federal officials at U.S. Customs and Border Protection agencies scrambled after the raids
began and the BNHR, PNCR, along with other human rights groups filed lawsuits,
including the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, in October 2007,
alleging the Otero Sheriff’s department violated the civil rights of Hispanic illegal
immigrants and citizens in Chaparral during Operation Stone Garden. The feds needed
to control damage to themselves, since Operation Stone Garden was sponsored by the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security.
They explained in the media that Stone Garden reimburses local law enforcement
agencies for overtime expenses incurred in providing a "second line of defense" and
enhancing border security, and that Stone Garden targets human and drug-trafficking and
terrorism threats. “The hope is that those crimes can be better detected by providing
reimbursement for patrols deployed by border area law enforcement agencies, said Lloyd
Easterling, a Washington, D.C.-based spokesman for Customs and Border Protection”
(Romo 2007). Easterling went on to say that it was “not uncommon for state or local law
enforcement agents to summon Border Patrol agents to pick up illegal immigrants
encountered during regular duties, such as at traffic stops” (Romo 2007). But, asked if one
of Stone Garden's goals is to enlist local law enforcement in locating illegal immigrants
living in the United States, Easterling said: "No. There is no immigration authority
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conveyed to state and local agencies" (Romo 2007).
The Otero Sheriff was left proverbially “twisting in the wind” unable to sustain the
cost of further litigation and awards to victims of his abuse, as Maricopa County Sheriff,
Joe Arpaio does in Arizona. Why the people of Maricopa County continue to support
Arpaio after having to pay astronomical awards and settlements to victims of his racism and
abuse of power is one of the most puzzling things about contemporary Arizona. “From
2004 through November 2007, Arpaio was the target of 2,150 lawsuits in U.S. District
Court and hundreds more in Maricopa County courts, with more than $50 million in claims
being filed, 50 times as many lawsuits as the New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, and
Houston jail systems combined” (Sterling 2010). Dating back to 1997 and before,
allegations of cruel treatment of immigrants, inmates as well as living conditions have been
cited by Amnesty International (1997) and others in reports issued on the treatment of
immigrants and inmates in Maricopa County facilities.
The only explanation of the continued support for Arpaio by the people of Maricopa
County that makes any sense to me are the legitimation of violence model and four human
flaws that often are bound into one: greed, racism, hatred and stupidity. Don’t they see it
would be much cheaper for them to just treat all people as human beings with dignity and
move on, into the century that is leaving them behind? As opposed to those in Arizona, it
is a great credit to the people in the El Paso southwest who do not put-up with tyrants such
as Arpaio and his abuses of authority those in Arizona support at such great cost,
financially, as well as to their future and “souls.”

Perhaps “Sheriff Joe” Arpaio would

have been retired by the people of Arizona (I know there are lots of good people there) if
the so-called “War on Terror,” in wake of the 2001 Al Qaida terror attacks, had not burst
into the world. Perhaps it is the legitimation of violence that fuels Arpaio’s career long after
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he should have been retired, or fired.
The Otero Sheriff, his deputies and their sycophants of persecution in Chaparral had
wandered onto the wrong side of history in the summer of 2007. They had become social
dinosaurs of a sort in the El Paso southwest, in that their time had passed in the belief
systems of a greater number of the community’s members. The forms of aggression, abuse
and violence they unleashed on the immigrant settlement in Chaparral in the summer of
2007 would no longer be tolerated by the vast majority of others, who cherish human
rights, and had become organized, in the El Paso southwest. Despite the country’s recent
and ongoing wars and associated legitimation of violence, that I have no doubt influenced
the persecutors to rise briefly from their social extinction, and act out their aggression on
the immigrants, they were forced back into extinction (really more of a social dormancy or
containment) – for the BNHR had already risen and were better adapted to the social
environment they had in fact helped frame.
As long as the BNHR or other such networks thrive the dinosaurs will be contained
and possibly socially extinct for good someday. As long as the framework of universal
human rights the BNHR has fomented persists – and pending the scaling down in the
residual effects of war and its associated legitimation of violence continues in this current
period – such abusive tyrants are dinosaurs. But, if the country slips back into escalating
war, instead of waning war – and even beyond all war, all bets are off. And the dinosaurs
will emerge again. It will always be so, as it has been such ever since war was invented
some 10,000 years ago by who I believe must have been imaginative but misguided
madmen (madwomen too no doubt).
Therefor resistance to persecution, violence, abuse by authority and war must be
vigilant forever more. Perhaps I cross a line that many other social scientists would not
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when I speak of the nature of the modern human species, whose emergence we can trace
back over 200,000 years ago, and other, closely related species of ancestors to modern
humans evolved from back over 6,000,000 years. But, I believe war and the forms of
aggression and violence it creates in society is un-natural, at the very least in comparison to
the human nature that those in the BNHR and everyday humanists the world-over embrace.
No doubt, when war was invented some 10,000 years ago, the anti-war-universally-prohuman forces were long before established amongst our species. But, as is always the case
it seems, war and its madness catches us off guard, and legitimation of violence rains down
on the population – thus mimicking the model of war, violence and aggression against
fellow human beings awhile before those who embrace peace, wisdom, understanding and
LOVE, to mobilize in resistance.
To avoid deeper slippage into an eternal darkness of violence, these wiser humans
must always be vigilant, always resisting the persecution of the vulnerable, be they Native
Americans; African Americans; Mexican Americans; gays and lesbians; the disabled; the
confused; the weak and vulnerable; the addicted and criminalized; immigrants of all
ethnicities; peoples of all cultures and continents; and our contemporary most socially
untouchable of the persecuted, such as the vilified Muslim peoples of the world, drug
addicts, and even the drug smugglers. For you, I and they are all human beings attempting
to cope in a world and existence we were born into not of our own choice and nobody can
really say they know if there is any good reason at all. We just know that nobody gets out
of here alive.
Those who choose to keep trying to live must cope with sad realities of our human
condition. But, human life has its wonderful rewards too, in empathy, support and love of
each other we find a meaning worthwhile. Like artists at work on a masterpiece – we work
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on our lives and society to make a more beautiful existence for human life. That is where I
suggest we all can create a worthwhile meaning while coping to make sense of our
existence and resist the persecution of life.
I am still ignorant of the vast variety of social phenomena that happens in such
great fluidity in the world; ignorant of most of what and why others think and do as they
do. But, I think I am a little wiser; I know I am older - now fifty-one; wiser to life and
society. Therefore, I can say with great conviction: nothing makes more sense to me at this
stage of my life than to link-up with the human rights network and help in the collaborative
masterpiece of resistance to persecution they task away on. We need not fear the wrath of
the persecutors for helping those they target, the resisters are on the right side of history,
and we should have no fear of joining the resisters. And

we

should

not

hate

the

persecutors- but hate the force behind them; the legitimation of violence.
Fear not the persecutors or their prisons and walls, for their prisons are full of
resisters and behind their walls are millions of resisters. In other words, we got lots of
friends on the inside and lots of friends on the outside. Be happy to embrace the resisters
and make plans with them to tear down the prisons and walls of the persecutors. I argue that
nothing else makes sense or gives more worthwhile meaning to forever more resist with the
persecuted in peace, love and wisdom, as long as this planet’s environment is of a nature
suitable to our species adaptation.

And that, of course is a whole other important

concern which this thesis is not focused on, but I will address here in closing.
Based on what ninety-nine percent of all climatologists believe currently, the
climate on earth in fifty years, will be what it was like 600,000 years ago (citations are not
necessary as they have been published ad nauseam.) Therefore, as the forthwith “hellscape” that these scientist predict nears, the young children of today will need to cope with
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much harder issues than we. It will be as if they are like the doomed children of Chaparral,
born into a dead-end place with no future, but worse. And they will wonder why current
humans persecuted others so greatly to no logical ends; including the persecution of drug
users and those who provide them. In the twilight of our species, it will need all the drugs,
alcohol and other coping enhancers it can get. Persecutors will probably still exist but their
cause will be laughable in comparison to the persecution by nature upon our species in the
end. And then there will be no persecutors or resisters left to play the game of life. So,
enjoy it while you can. And, I recommend you join the resistance as I find it gives one
greater purpose of meaning. Besides, the people are much nicer than the other side. No
doubt. Resist.
Instead of expanding an already militarized border enforcement system, legislators
should prioritize community security and the protection of human rights of people who live
at the border.

Heyman (2010b) explains the great potential of the El Paso/ Juárez

borderlands from his universal human rights perspective:
"The region offers impressive linguistic and cultural resources for bridging the
economies of the United States and Latin America," - "U.S. approaches to border security
that promote trade, interaction, and public safety through efficient and effective ports of
entry are key to developing this positive future” (p. 2).
Furthermore, militarized border “security” and violations of immigrant human
rights do not make us safe or secure – they do the opposite. The true path to safety and
security in border communities and entire nations is to allow the flow of migrants and
enhance the creation of transnational friendships, families and trade across borders. The
family ties, friendships and trade across borders in places like El Paso/ Juárez are the
definition of a society; the things that bind it and create real safety and security for the
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local, national and global community.
The legitimation of violence is without a doubt a factor in the social construction of
others into negative forms that should not be treated with understanding and care. Instead
of positively interacting and caring for strangers, immigrants, vulnerable youth, drug
addicts, and just about anyone – these others are typed as criminals, degenerates, dangerous
and contaminating forms to be criminalized and dealt with harshly; prison, blocking,
abusing and even executing. The legitimation of violence creates a social environment that
encourages the construction of ever more prisons instead of building schools, clinics,
bridges to the next level of human existence, and distribution of resources for vulnerable
people, or support and understanding for the addicted and confused.
The last decade of escalating extreme violence in Mexico associated with the drug
cartels is very complex and no single cause can accurately explain the magnitude of the
atrocities, including hundreds of decapitated and mutilated corpses, but I have no doubt that
social learning, which is the underlying concept of the legitimation of violence model, is
the major underlying factor. Who or what is the major, initiator of the model of violence
related to Mexican drug cartel violence is difficult if not impossible to determine. But, I see
this as a moot point at this stage. Both Mexico and the U.S. have histories that include
horrendous acts and traditions of violence that will perhaps always be embedded in the
attitudes and belief systems of their populations through an ongoing and fluid social
learning process. The cycle of violence in both nations have independence, but at the same
time have a relationship with each other - and do have influence upon the other. In short,
and in more simple explanation than the reality, the wars the U.S. engages in influence and
provides a model of violence for its populations as well as Mexican populations, and the
wars of Mexico, though they are internal, influence and provide a model of violence for
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their populations as well as in the U.S.
Campbell (2009) (2011) provides understanding of the contemporary, horrific
violence and atrocities in Mexico. He explains that:
“In 1993 Juárez homicide totals surpassed 100 for the first time in recent history,
and from 1994 on, total homicides surpassed the 200 mark and remained there for the rest
of the decade (with the single exception of 1999, when they declined in the aftermath of
Carrillo Fuentes’s death and the violent shake-up within the cartel that occurred
immediately after it). By 2000, Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, Amado’s brother, regained control
of the trafficking market, and the homicide rates leveled off at about 200 to 300 a year as
business returned to “normal” (Campbell 2009) (2011).
“Starting in 2008 the rate started sky-rocketing and “officially there were 3,111 total
murders in 2010, but since many deaths go unreported, the real number is likely
significantly higher”(Campbell 2009)(2011, p.19).
Campbell (2009 (2011) asks and explains: “How do we explain this outrageous
carnage? Beyond historical particulars and the intra- and inter-cartel wars, five main social
processes coincided in recent years to produce the unprecedented violence in Juárez. These
processes each have differential time lines and cycles; they are not all unified and identical,
but they have collectively produced the hyper-violence and lawlessness” (p.19). Campbell
(2009) (2011) describes in detail the five main social processes that coincided in recent
years to produce the unprecedented violence in Juárez. And here I give the five in brief:
“First, the maquiladora model failed to produce economic mobility or social
“development” for the majority of the border population.”
“Second, the global economic crisis closed many Juárez maquilas and exported lowwage jobs to China.”
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“Third, ongoing political problems in Mexico after a flawed transition to democracy
brought the consolidation of free trade and neoliberal policies begun in the 1980s.
“Fourth, Calderón’s ill-conceived “drug war,” launched in 2006 and sponsored and
promoted by the U.S. government, became a disaster. Everywhere Calderón sent the
military and federal police, the violence increased. In the states of Michoacán, Chihuahua,
Sinaloa, Durango, and others, the bloody story was the same. Human rights violations and
homicides (including the femicides) skyrocketed. Although rival cartels had been killing
each other for years, Calderón’s improvised military mobilization threw gasoline on the fire
and turned a problematic criminal situation into a virtual civil war. The U.S. government
pushed Mexico to fight the drug war, and Mexicans are paying the price for it.”
“And finally, the rise of a “counterculture of crime” in Mexico beginning in the
1990s emerged hand in hand with economic decline, political illegitimacy, and the
decadence of law enforcement and the judicial system. The marginalized masses of
unemployed and semi-employed workers—especially the youth who are ignored and
isolated in a rigid class hierarchy and now in a heavily consumer-oriented, neoliberal
Mexican society—became the shock troops for cartels, gangs, and kidnapping and extortion
rings. Organized crime, in fact, is propelled by unemployment and the hunger for consumer
goods, social mobility, and the cosmopolitan lifestyles advertised in the omnipresent
cyber/electronic/television imagery beamed to a Mexican populace that has less and less
means of obtaining them through legitimate means” (2011, p. 21-22)
As Professor Howard Campbell is one of my mentors and chair of my thesis
committee, who I have had countless discussions on the violence in Mexico, I know he
gives credence to the legitimation of violence model and concurs with me that the U.S. and
Mexico mutually legitimate violence across borders as well as within them.
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In

conversations with me - Campbell took note in 2006-2007, early on – even before the most
obscene escalation of violence in Mexico - which the Mexican Cartel violence had seemed
to mimic or copy the violence in the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
While I don’t think the U.S. is the only cause of violence in Mexico or Mexico the
major cause of violence in the U.S. the nations do reinforce violent behaviors in a mutual
legitimation of violence. For either nation to condemn the other as “bloody” or “violent” is
highly hypocritical by both at this point. The contemporary wars of the U.S. and in Mexico
remove any moral authority from either nation for the foreseeable future. How to break the
cycle of violence within each nation will not come from one nation guiding the other to
higher morality – each has none. It requires individuals from within each nation to rise
against the violence in their own borders while reaching across borders to like-minded
individuals of the other nation to break the cycle of violence and multi-laterally begin
Legitimation of Violence Ending (LOVE). This in fact, has begun.
The Mexican and U.S. societies both have their own traditions of violence deeprooted in their cultures, but the LOV associated with the U.S. going to war on other
populations and the so-called “War on Drugs” does, I argue effect violence in both
countries, including in places like Juárez, and Chaparral. When West Side Loco pee-wee
members understand that their own country has gone to war on people in Afghanistan and
Iraq / “enemies” they are more likely to adapt the violence traditions of that war as well as
the traditions of the Mexican cartels against their “enemies” as both the U.S. government
and the Mexican Cartels provide the model of using violence and murder to solve conflict
and problems. And as are the children to become violent - so are the sheriff’s, racists,
nativists and other of the multi-forces of persecution. In short, we reap what we sow.
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Illustration 5.1: Josiah Heyman, President, Border Network for Human Rights, 2013.

Illustration 5.2: Border Fence Peace Demonstration at Sunland Park, New Mexico & Anapara, Chihuahua, 2011.
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Illustration 5.3-a: Border Fence Peace Demonstration at
Sunland Park, New Mexico & Anapara, Chihuahua in 2011

Illustration 5.3-b: Looking at the Mexican side of fence between Anapra and Sunland Park during
the Border Fence Peace Demonstration, 2011.
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